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When in 1982 the Boston Symphony Orchestra cancelled a
contract with the actress Vanessa Redgrave, in response to vocif-
erous protests of her political beliefs, Redgrave wanted to sue for
more than just contract damages. The ensuing litigation under
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act consumed seven years, pro-
duced three appellate decisions, and gave birth to a potent new
defense for private employers in cases involving political retal-
iation against employees. This article analyzes the famous case in
terms of constitutional law, political liberty, and artistic choice.
Its structure encompasses a narrative of the events from two
opposing perspectives — Peter Sellars's and Seiji Ozawa's; an
historical exploration of political blacklisting; and an analysis of
the legal doctrines that ultimately determined the outcome of the
Redgrave case.
I. SELLARS'S STORY
The Boston Symphony Orchestra "is quite simply one of the
outstanding cultural institutions in the world," said Peter Sellars,
testifying as the lead-off witness in the 1984 federal court trial of
Vanessa Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra. "[A]mong symphony
t Copyright © 1989 Marjorie Heins.
* Staff Counsel, Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. The author participated in
drafting amicus curiae briefs at several stages of the appellate process in Redgrave v. Boston
Symphony Orchestra.
Thanks to Arthur Berney for perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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orchestras, a case can be made for it being . . the best in this
country and really in a league with a handful in western Europe."'
Sellars was only 25 but already known as a promising, creative
theater director when, in February 1981, Thomas Morris, the Gen-
eral Manager of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, asked him to
submit a proposal for staging Igor Stravinsky's opera-oratorio, Oed-
ipus Rex. Stark and formal, Oedipus Rex was to be the featured work
at the BSO's 1982 centenary celebration: three concerts at Sym-
phony Hall in Boston, two at Carnegie Hall in New York, and more
the following summer at Tanglewood. Soprano Jessye Norman was
to sing the role of Jocasta; tenor Kenneth Riegel was to be Oedipus. 2
. The BSO had chosen an all-Stravinsky program because of the
composer's historical associations with the Symphony. The other
work on the program was to be Stravinsky's Symphony of Psalms,
which Serge Koussevitzky, then the BSO's conductor and a longtime
friend of Stravinsky's, had commissioned in 1930 to commemorate
the Orchestra's 50th birthday.3 A deeply religious work, Symphony
of Psalms was composed, in Stravinsky's words, "for the glory of
God [and] dedicated to the Boston Symphony Orchestra." 4 Both
Symphony of Psalms and Oedipus Rex had their American premieres
at the BSO. 5
Sellars told the Redgrave jury of Stravinsky's importance to
contemporary music. "From his sensation in Paris, total sensation,
The Rite of Spring, when there were riots at the first performance
and . . . the audience was stampeding, Stravinsky had to be whisked
out of the back door of the hall and into a taxicab to the other side
of the city, things have been very lively." 6 Stravinsky took cultural
Trial Transcript at vol. 1, afternoon session, 46, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Or-
chestra, Inc., 602 F. Stipp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (C.A. No. 82-3193—K).
2 Id. at vol. 11, 12-13.
3 E.W. WHITE, STRAVINSKY 98-99,359 (1984).
Id. at 359.
Id.; Trial Transcript at vol. 11, 12, vol. 1, afternoon session, 50; Memorandum from
Thomas Morris to Abram "1". Collier, President of BSO Trustees (Mar. 30, 1982) (trial exhibit
19); Dyer, Extending the Language of Musk, Boston Globe, Dec. 6, 1988, at 79 (describing
composer Elliot Carter's participation in BSO premiere of Oedipus Rex while a student at
Harvard).
6 Trial Transcript at vol. I, afternoon session, 47. Sellars may have been exaggerating
the famous story of the 1913 Rite of Spring premiere in Paris. Although the audience virtually
rioted, the peribrmance was completed, and at 2:00 A.M Stravinsky, Cocteau, Diaghilev, and
Nijinsky "piled into a cab and were driven to the Bois de Boulogne in search of fresh air -
and quiet." E.W. WHITE, supra note 3, at 45.
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myths (like Oedipus Rex) and "made them very powerful for a mod-
ern audience."'
Oedipus Rex, with music by Stravinsky and libretto by Jean Coc-
teau, retells the ancient and much-psychoanalyzed Greek myth in a
stately, rigorous oratorio form. Like Symphony of Psalms, composed
three years later, Oedipus Rex was to be performed in Latin, to give
it a "monumental" quality." Sellars's stage plan included an eight-
foot platform for the soloists, above the chorus and orchestra, and
an industrial-size elevator that would raise Jocasta as much as
twenty-five feet higher." Sellars thought this height crucial to the
production.
Sellars insisted that Symphony of Psalms be performed after Oed-
ipus Rex, even though in concerts the "big staged work" usually
comes last.'° He wrote General Manager Morris:
The two Stravinsky pieces have the exact relation to each
other as Sophocles' Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonnus:
the latter is the benediction of the former and to reverse
their order is to go against every grain of content . . . .
Oedipus Rex is the journey toward knowledge which we
must pass through before we are ready "to enter in" to
the elevated, visionary level of experience attained and
presented by Symphony of Psalms."
Trial Transcript at vol. 1, afternoon session, 49.
Id. at 50. In a July 1981 letter to Thomas Morris, Sellars compared Oedipus Rex to the
Japanese Nob plays, which are also "deliberately set in archaic language not understood by
the audience, eschewing trivial psychologizing soap-opera detail, and elevating the tragedy
to the highest level. This is the 'aspect monumental' called for in Oedipus Rex, and the reason
Stravinsky chose Latin." Letter from Peter Sellars to Thomas Morris 2 ( July 9, 1981) (trial
exhibit 501). According to one critic, Stravinsky
liked the idea of moving backward from a "secular" to a "sacred" language,
which is why he had Jean Cocteau's text [for Oedipus Rex] translated into Cicer-
onian Latin . , .Oratorio suited his desire to petrify the urgency and activism
of Wagner's music drama: he wanted a "still life," he told Cocteau ....Stravinsky
quoted Andres Gide's remark that "classical works are beautiful only by virtue
of their subjugated romanticism." So it is with Oedipus: oratorio serves to disci-
pline and formalize opera. Despite its classical language and the undramatic
rigidity of the action, the characters — the dangerously arrogant Oedipus and
the babbling Jocasta — arc detnon-infested romantics. Oratorio as written by
Stravinsky is opera in a straitjacket.
P. CONRAD, A SONG OF LOVE AND DEATH: THE MEANING ON OPERA 76 (1987).
9 Sellars's letter to Morris, supra note 8, at 2,
1 ° Id. at 6.
1 Id
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Sellars wanted a bird of peace or dove to fly over the orchestra at
the end of Symphony of Psalms, though Morris thought that touch "a
little hokey. " 12
Oedipus Rex had a narrator — the only part not spoken in Latin.
Sellars viewed this small role as critical: "the device of the narrator
is clearly included to bring this tragedy sharply into the tangible,
quotidian, localized experience of the audience: an affirmation of
the present tense."'s For the BSO production, Sellars wanted some-
one contemporary, who spoke forcefully on current events. His first
choice was Ted Koppel, a newsman who possessed what Sellars
described as "uncanny . . . equilibrium as he announces world
catastrophes," and a "complex . . . sense of irony ... an extraor-
dinary example of Sophoclean and Stravinskian self-control and
detachment." 14
Whatever may have been his level of Sophoclean detachment,
Koppel was not available to narrate Oedipus Rex. Nor were other
journalists whom Sellars had in mind, and when, in early March
1982, Sellars, Morris, and the BSO's Artistic Administrator, William
Bernell, met in Paris with the Orchestra's Music Director, Seiji
Ozawa, the narrator still had not been cast. Rehearsals for Oedipus
Rex were to start on April 12 for performances on April 15, 16 and
17 in Boston and April 21 and 22 in New York.
Sellars recalled the Paris meeting as
quite a hectic and frenetic brainstorming session . . . . In
the course of the flurry, the name of Vanessa Redgrave
came up. And I must say, the sun shown for a moment.
We were all quite elated. Here was somebody whose gifts
as a performer were beyond questioning and beyond com-
pare and who had the kind of phenomenal intensity that
could make a very short part come off to very impressive
effect because, in fact . . . there are only three or four
very brief speeches for the narrator. 15
Redgrave, Sellars told the jury, had the "ability to charge a very
small amount of material with a very great amount of meaning,
which is a special quality that some performers have and is very
12 Trial Transcript at vol. 5, 55 (Morris testimony), vol. 4, morning session, 11, 14 (Ozawa
testimony).
13 Sellars's letter to Morris, supra note 8, at 6. The idea for the narrator was Cocteau's;
Stravinsky at first disliked it. E,W. WHITE, supra note 3, at 329-3(1.
' 4 Sellars's letter to Morris, supra note 8, at 6.
Trial Transcript at vol. 2, 14-15.
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crucial in the case of Oedipus Rex." Redgrave was "not only a fiery
personality but one of the great classical actresses of the British
stage."'6
Sellars, Morris, and Bernell were aware that Redgrave's ardent
support of the Palestine Liberation Organization made her contro-
versial." They quickly agreed, however, that her political activities
were irrelevant to the hiring decision. In this instance, moreover,
where the BSO wanted "something exciting, something that would
be talked about and something that would also bring the orchestra
sharply into the twentieth century and be an event for television,"
the political intensity of Redgrave's presence would if anything be
an advantage."
When contacted, recalled Sellars, Redgrave's agents were at first
"extremely rude and said, `the Boston Symphony? What's that?'" 19
But Redgrave knew very well what it was, and was thrilled to get
the offer. 2° Although famous internationally for such movie roles
as lsadora, Morgan, The Trojan Women, Blow-up, and Julia, Redgrave
had begun her career (assisted by her father, Sir Michael Redgrave)
1" Id. at 16, Redgrave came to international attention in 1965 with the offbeat British
movie Morgan. Ismail Merchant, who later produced The Bostonians with Redgrave in a
starring role, testified at trial that Morgan had first set him on her trail: "I ... absolutely was
riveted by her performance, and 1 thought this is an actress I want to work with." Id. at vol.
8, 131. Film director Sidney Lumet also testified on her uniqueness: "She has lyricism which
is extremely rare ... combination of strength and delicacy, ... [and] a complete intangible
..., just the depth of the talent itself." Id. at vol. 9, morning session, 51-53. One critic wrote
of Redgrave's Oscar-winning performance in the film Julia: "This saintly Freudian Marxist
queen, on easy terms with Darwin, Engels, Hegel, and Einstein, might have been a joke with
almost anyone but Vanessa Redgrave in the role .... Redgrave is so well endowed by nature
to play queens that she can act simply in the role (which doesn't occupy much screen time)
and casually, yet lyrically, embody Lillian Hellman's dream friend." P. Kael, A Woman for All
Seasons?, in WHEN 'HIE LIGHTS Go DOWN 306-07 (1975).
17 Redgrave testified that her political activities ranged from running 14 Parliament in
1974 on the Workers' Revolutionary Party ticket to sponsoring a nursery school in London.
Trial Transcript at vol. 6, morning session, 14, 24. She produced and appeared as a news-
caster in a 1977 film, The Palestinian, which was shot in Lebanese refugee camps, and
distributed a second film, Occupied Palestine, in the early 1980s. Id. at vol. 5, 105, vol. 6,
morning session, 23, vol. 7, afternoon session, 2. Pressed on cross-examination about her
political views by defense attorney Robert Sullivan, she told the jury that she opposed Zionism
but not the existence of the State of Israel: "I never said there is no room fir Israel. 1 never
said that the State of Israel should be liquidated or overthrown. I don't believe it. That's not
what 1 advocate." Id. at vol, 7, morning session, 90.
18 Id. at vol. 2, 18. Morris testified in detail about his heightened hopes for television
broadcasts once the media announced Redgrave's involvement. Id. at vol. 3, 112, 135-36,
170, 176.
19 Id. at vol. 2, 20. Bernell testified that Redgrave's agent, Bert Taylor, was "rather short
with me" but called back the next day to apologize. Id. at vol. 1 1, 31-32.
11 Id. at vol. 7, afternoon session, 24, vol. 5, 93.
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as a classical actress, both in London theater and in concerts. She
knew the history of the Stravinsky-Cocteau work, and knowledge-
ably discussed with Bernell what recordings were available for her
to study by way of preparation."
Negotiating the deal was not difficult. Morris, according to
Sellars, believed that securing Redgrave
was such an exciting coup for the symphony that it was
worth going . . . a little beyond the limits that . . had
previously been thought of financially for this ... because
all of us felt that she was, indeed, the solution to this
evening and really the last missing link in what we were
all convinced would be one of the most exciting projects
we had ever worked on. 22
The Orchestra announced the engagement of Redgrave on
March 25, 1982; the next day the Boston Globe reported that the
BSO had "scored a theatrical coup" by hiring her. 23
That same day, March 26, protests began. The BSO staff ini-
tially fielded them coolly, telling angry callers, in accordance with
Morris's instructions, that Redgrave had been hired "exclusively on
artistic grounds." 24
The BSO was hardly the first to have been assaulted by an anti-
Redgrave campaign. In 1978, Jewish Defense League activists had
protested her Academy Award for Julia, then burned her effigy
outside the auditorium where she was to receive the prize. 25 In
1979, CBS-TV withstood pressures to fire Redgrave from its pro-
duction of Playing for Time, a holocaust docudrama. The network
disputed the protesters' contention that it should have considered
Redgrave's political views in making the casting choice. It quoted
the screenwriter, Arthur Miller, as saying:
If this attack is solely upon her past views and actions it
ought to stop short, it seems to me, at trying to drive her
out of a role which can only lift the suffering of the Jews,
21 Id. at vol. 11, 47-48.
22 Id. at vol. 2, 21. Morris also described it as a "coup." id. at vol. 4, morning session.
107.
23 Id. at vol. 2, 23-24; McCanon, Classical Musicians Aid One of Their Own, Boston Globe,
Mar. 28, 1982, at 81 (trial exhibit 18).
24 Trial Transcript at vol. 3, 118, 142 (Morris testimony), vol. 2, 29 (Sellars testimony),
vol. 11, 155-58 (testimony of Judith Gordon Gassner).
25 Id. at vol. G, morning session, 27; see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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especially Jewish women, to a new ground of understand-
ines
Despite these precedents, by Monday, March 29, the BSO's
sangfroid had begun to melt. Orchestra management knew that the
local branch of the Anti-Defamation League would be meeting to
discuss whether to censure the BSO. 27 Irving Rabb, a Symphony
trustee influential in Jewish philanthropic affairs, called General
Manager Morris on Monday morning to ask him to get out of the
contract. 28 By mid-morning Morris was extremely worried, and the
staff was, according to Sellars, "slightly moving into crisis mode." 2 •
Sellars explained to the jury that the BSO administration was
acutely sensitive to criticism from the Jewish community. Tom Mor-
ris told the others that
historically at the symphony there had been some . .
problem of anti-Semitism, and that they were extremely
proud of the fact that progress had been made in this
area and that there were now Jewish people on the board
of the symphony and actively participating ... and that
this decision could have serious consequences to that and
there could be a backlash that would damage the advance
that had been made in relations with the Jewish commu-
n i ty. 30
The idea of substituting narrators first came up during the
March 29 conversations. Sellars testified that Morris asked him if
he could stage the production without Redgrave. 3 ' The controversy
provoked by her engagement was more than they had anticipated;
Morris worried that Redgrave "might be the thing that would sink
the whole ship, and it might be best to throw her overboard." The
public might regard her appearance with the Symphony as an en-
21} Letter from CBS Broadcast Croup (Sept. 1979) (trial exhibit 38).
27 Trial Transcript at vol. 2, 27 (Sellars testimony).
22 Id. at vol. 3, 68, 74 (deposition of Irving Rabb, as read into evidence). Morris disputed
Rabb's testimony on this point, denying that Rabb had asked him to get out of the cont ract.
Id. at vol. 3, 120, 124 (Morris testimony). Morris's recollection was that Rabb told him
Redgrave was "at best . . . a very controversial piece of casting," and he replied, "we hired
her because she is a terrific actress." Id. at 118. Rabb testified that he said: Is there any way
you can get out of it? . I think you will offend a tremendous number of Jews in the
community if she performs." Id. at 68, 74.
22 Id. at vol. 2, 28-29 (Sellars testimony), vol. 3, 28-29 (Morris testimony).
3° Id. at vol. 2, 30.
21 Id. at 31-32. Morris's testimony on this point was equivocal: he did not "believe" he
advocated changing narrators. Id. at vol. 3, 193.
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dorsement of her views. By late Monday, said Sellars, "a kind of
almost bunker mentality had set in." 32
Initially, Sellars agreed with Morris. The Stravinsky program
"was based on very subtle musical and dramatic issues" that could
be lost in "a storm over . . . who supported the PLO and who
supported Israel." 33
 But by the next day, March 30, Sellars had
thought further. He now saw ominous implications in firing Red-
grave: "I felt it was a hideous idea . . . On no moral grounds was
the act of removing Ms. Redgrave acceptable. It was fully the equiv-
alent of in 1933, because of a certain political climate, saying at the
Vienna State Opera, let's not have a Jewish person sing the role of
Siegfried . . . It was a form of blacklisting." Sellars argued that in
Russia people are denied work because of their politics, not in the
United States. He reminded Morris of an incitrent during the First
World War when the BSO had fired a conductor, Karl Muck, be-
cause of anti-German hysteria. 34
By Tuesday, March 30, the conversation focused on possible
disruption of the concerts. The BSO at this point had not received
any "explicit threats of disruption," 35 but Morris and the public
relations staff began to imagine possible catastrophes: boos, stink
bombs, even a shooting. In such a "volatile situation," it would be
" Id. at vol, 2, 33. Morris testified he did not "believe" he used the nautical metaphor,
but "there seemed to be a general sentiment" by late Monday "that it would be difficult to
go ahead." /d. at vol. 4, afternoon session, 9. The vitriol of the phone calls had so alarmed
the staff that at a 5 P.M. meeting, "the general conclusion" was "that we could not go forward."
Id. at vol. 3, 190, 192.
33 Id. at vol. 2, 34.
' 4 Id. at 37.
3' Morris memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. The question of whether, and when, the
BSO received any actual threat of performance disruption was much in dispute at trial.
There was testimony about a telephone call From one Arthur Bernstein, a former officer of
the by-then defunct Jewish Defense League of Massachusetts. Judith Gassner, in 1982 a
member of the BSO's public relations staff, testified that Bernstein had threatened "bloodshed
and violence" if Redgrave appeared at Symphony Hall. Trial Transcript at vol. I I, 160.
Bernstein testified that he had merely promised a picket line on the sidewalk such as the
JDL had mounted some twelve years earlier when Ukrainian dancers performed at Symphony
Hall. Id. at vol. 9, afternoon session, 45-47, 53-54. Whatever the actual substance of the
conversation, Morris testified that he did not learn of this call until about noon on Thursday,
April 1, after the decision to cancel the concerts had been made and indeed after publication
of the press release announcing the cancellation. Id. at vol. 5, 8. Bernstein also testified he
had called on Thursday, and the BSO's press office notes reflect this. Id. at vol. 12, morning
, session, 32-33. Gassner insisted that Bernstein called on Wednesday, as did Bernell. Id. at
vol. 11, 118. Sellars remembered hearing about a call from the JDL regarding disruption on
Wednesday, but with no reference w "bloodshed and violence." Id. at vol. 2, 99.
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"impossible to predict what type of public disturbance might en-
sue. ”36
Morris's fears were aggravated at a Tuesday afternoon meeting
with Boston Police Commissioner Joseph Jordan. According to Mor-
ris's Tuesday memo to Abe Collier, President of the Board of Trust-
ees, Jordan warned him that, should the JDL get involved, the police
would not be able to avert an interruption of the performance."
Morris noted in his memo that Redgrave traveled with a bodyguard,
that she had not performed in the United States in four or five
years, and that "the basic political problem here is the use of Miss
Redgrave's art to express her political beliefs. She is strong-minded
and unpredictable and is likely to turn the BSO situation, in what-
ever way possible, to her advantage." 38 Morris's memo concluded:
Given all the information, there is no question that pro-
ceeding with the engagement might probably lead to dis-
ruption of the concerts, at best . . . At this point I cannot
recommend a course of security which would reasonably
guarantee no disruptions, nor do I have such guarantee
from Carnegie Hall. The question then becomes how to
disengage, should Redgrave not choose to withdraw her-
self, without compromising the clear, artistic ideals of the
BSO and our need to preserve the freedom of artistic
choice in the future."
Peter Sellars vehemently disagreed. Late Monday evening he
had reminded Morris that "as of yet, no threats had been received,
and there was no reason to suppose that such a situation was even
probable . . . . I felt that such an extreme reaction was completely
premature." 4° Morris was not convinced. He pressed Sellars to agree
36 Id. at vol. 2, 47-48 (Sellars testimony).
37 Morris memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. Because the performances were sold out, it
was not entirely clear how JDL members, in Jordan's scenario, would get into the hall. Trial
Transcript at vol. 4, afternoon session, 39. Morris acknowledged that Jordan had promised
a sufficient police presence to ensure public safety. Id, Jordan testified to the same effect. Id.
at vol. 12, 136, 140.
38 Morris memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. -rhe basis for Morris's prognostications is not
clear. Redgrave testified that she had never interrupted or otherwise used an artistic perfor-
mance to express her political views. Trial Transcript at vol. 5, 91, vol. 7, afternoon session,
34. 
	 -
30 Morris memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
4° Trial Transcript at vol. 2, 48 (Sellars testimony).
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to go forward without Redgrave, saying the decision was his, and
"in his opinion . . . it was impossible to proceed" with her. 4 ' On
Tuesday, Morris instructed the press people to remove Redgrave's
name from an advertisement scheduled to appear in the Sunday
New York Times, and the group set to work attempting to draft a
press statement, without success."
Sellars refused to acquiesce. From Tuesday to Wednesday his
conviction strengthened. He came up with new arguments to per-
suade Morris and the others. Given the level of protests received,
he said, picketing was the worst the BSO was likely to face. And the
presence of pickets would not harm but in fact would intensify the
theatrical experience, making the audience concentrate on the mes-
sage of Stravinsky's music. The pieces "are about extremely large
and profound human issues of an ability to prejudge another hu-
man being":
[T]he point of Oedipus Rex is that he tells his guards to
scour the city of Thebes for the murderer of his father.
And the point is after he's done trying to bully everyone
else on their political points of view and ... after the most
intense introspection, he realizes the heart of these issues
lies within his own self. And Thebes, the city, is destroyed
by a plague, and the plague is only lifted when one man,
Oedipus Rex, faces the moral imperative. And in Sopho-
cles it's not a choice, it's an imperative. The purification
of the individual as the highest exemplification and serious
possibility for the moral health and fiber of an entire
community is Sophocles' subject. 1 felt that this would be
overwhelmingly and resoundingly demonstrated by the
symphony making a courageous stand, and that the cour-
age of the symphony's stand would be felt by and rein-
forced in the courage of the performance itself . . . ."
41 Id. at 48-49.
' 2 Id. at 55-59.
" Id. at 91-92. Oedipus Rex, scored mostly in minor keys, "is dominated by the search
for D major, which is the key of the inner fight" into which Oedipus finally emerges. Mellers,
Stravinsky:s Oedipus as 20th-Century Hero, quoted in E.W. WHrrE, supra note 3, at 335 n. 1.
Peter Sellars's career since the BSO episode has been marked by his determination to
render works of classical music, particularly opera, relevant to contemporary audiences. He
has transported the three Mozart-Da Ponte operas to modern locales: The Marriage of Figaro
to Trump Tower; Cosi Fan Tulle to a seaside diner; and Don Giovanni to Spanish Harlem.
See, e.g., Porter, Musical Events, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 15,1988, at 63-64; Rockwell, A
Sellarized "Figaro" in First Performance, The New York Times, July 15,1988, at C3, col. 4. He
staged Handel's Orlando at Cape Canaveral and his Guilio Cesare at a disarmament conference.
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Meanwhile, Morris and Bernell were keeping Seiji Ozawa, still
in Paris and condUcting Beethoven's Fidelio, apprised of develop-
ments. Ozawa at first suggested that the situation be explained to
Redgrave, who, as an artist, would surely understand the BSO's
dilemma and withdraw. 44 When she did not, and with only two
weeks until rehearsals began, Morris decided the only alternative
was cancellation. A transatlantic call with Ozawa was arranged for
Thursday April 1; Sellars understood it as "essentially an occasion
for good-byes."45
But once on the phone with the conductor, Sellars launched
into a last attempt at persuasion. He told Ozawa that "there were
very large dimensions to the concert as it developed that called
upon us to act ... heroically, in the manner of the music that both
of us spend most of our lives with." Ozawa responded that he had
to be neutral politically; his "only concern could be music," which
would not be served by disruption."
Sellars countered "that there were more important values at
stake than whether one has an auditorium of complete silence to
play music in." He reminded Ozawa that he was at that time con-
ducting Fidelio by Beethoven, which is
the most explicit statement for freedom of speech in the
world of art . . .. [T]o abandon these concerts and to
abandon Ms. Redgrave's participation in them was cow-
ardly and did dishonor to the works, ... not only the
specific Stravinsky works but works like Fidelio which both
he and I make our livelihood from and have been en-
trusted with as important cultural monuments. And I
spoke to him of our role as guardians of these. 47
Ozawa said that the situation was out of his hands.
P. CONRAD, supra. note 8, at 278, '293. A Sellars production of Wagner's 7'anniuiu.ser was set
in the contemporary world of televangelism; although controversial, the performance was
described by one reviewer as "the first truly alive opera 1 had seen in this country since —
well, since Sellars' production of Figaro." Porter, Musical Events, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 7,
1988, at 151.
44 Trial Transcript at vol. 4, morning session, 47-50.
45 Id. at vol. 2, 101.
46 Id. at 96,101-02.
47 Id. at 102-03. Fidelio departed from "the mythology of neoclassical opera" to address
the "intractable human realities" of politidal repression; instead of the heroine following the
hero to the underworld, she follows him td "the modern hell of a political prison." P. CONRAD,
supra note 8, at 127.
1294	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 30:1283
"I suppose at that point I wouldn't take no for an answer,"
testified Sellars.
It was for me ... a very large act to, at the age of 25,
decide to simply throw over a chance to stage one of the
greatest pieces that I have ever known with the orchestra
and the soloists that can play it better than it could ever
be played . . . It was a very rare occasion and occurring
to me at a very important point in my life and so their
hope was that I would reconsider . . . . And I could not. 48
The staff now attempted again to compose a press statement.
Morris's draft tried to justify the cancellation. But after much strug-
gle, it was agreed that "there were no statements that were finally
adequate or defensible that could be issued"; 49
 a BSO attorney who
was present advised that all reasons be deleted "because none of
them would hold up legally if this were brought to court." 8° The
final press release simply announced the cancellation of the Stra-
vinsky program, and substitution of the Berlioz Requiem, because of
"circumstances beyond [the Orchestra's) reasonable control." 51
Sellars's fundamental disagreement with Ozawa was over the
contingencies inherent in the very nature of theater. As he told the
jury, absolute silence during a live performance is
hardly de rigeur. [A] musical performance, like any theater
performance, is a collective experience which frequently
takes on dimensions that nobody can foresee . . . And
God knows in the history of concerts, there is a rich history
of disruption . . . [AJt one point when this was a living
vital art form, it was very crucial that there was wild au-
dience participation, people screaming patriotic slogans
during Verdi; . . in fact, music has a responsibility to
incite.52
48
 Trial Transcript at vol. 2, 104 (Sellars testimony).
49 Id. at 106.
5°
 Id. at 152.
5' Id. at 107; 13S0 Press Release, April I, 1982 (trial exhibit 28).
52
 Trial Transcript at vol. 2, 111-13; see also P. CONRAD, supra note 8, at 237. Milan's La
Scala was a place for political proclamations:
In 1800 a French official hastened there to announce the victory of the Napo-
leonic army over Melas at Marengo. It's this news which so dismays the mon-
archist Scarpia in the Rome of Tosca; to the newly radicalized public in Milan,
it was an occasion for rejoicing. In 1859, a performance of Norma at La Scala
incited an outcry against the occupying Austrian army. The Milanese in their
boxes and the Austrian officers in the orchestra stalls came to a showdown
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II. INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS SECURED
Although the Boston Symphony's press statement announcing
its cancellation of the centenary concerts cited, in the standard
boilerplate of contract, "circumstances beyond its reasonable con-
trol," the BSO would probably have compensated Redgrave (as it
did the other artists) in the amount of her contract fee. Indeed, it
formally tendered an offer of $31,000 ("plus accrued interest and
costs") shortly after suit was filed. 53
But for Redgrave, simply receiving the contract fee was not the
point. The BSO had acquiesced in pressures to punish her for her
political beliefs, to blacklist her, in the word that became a subject
of heated debate at the subsequent trial. Being fired by a prestigious
cultural institution in response to vociferous, emotional disagree-
ment with her politics and amid rumors of possible audience dis-
ruption would not exactly enhance her opportunities for other work
in the United States. This was the first time — despite previous
attempts that had been made to get her fired — that an employer
had acquiesced." The BSO's example could be insidious.
Yet blacklisting, in acquiescence to popular antagonism to a
performer's politics, had been endemic in the United States in the
1950s, and most of its victims had found little relief in the courts. 55
Part of the question in Redgrave's case was whether the law had
changed, whether a legal theory, beyond simple breach of contract,
during the scene when Norma, striking the gong, goads the Druids to revenge
themselves on the imperial Roman invaders. The chorus bayed for blood, and
the boxholders joined in its cries of "Guerra! Guerra!" . . . Opera and the
cause of Italian unification were literally synonymous.
Id.
Sellars might have also told the jury that Oedipus Rex was booed during an early Paris
performance, with Cocteau narrating. Stravinsky was not upset or surprised. 3 STRAVINSKY:
SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE 131 n.40 (R. Craft ed. 1985).
53 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc.,
602 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (C,A. No. 82-3193—K) (denying liability but tendering
offer pursuant to FED, R. Civ. P. 68).
" See supra note 25 and accompanying text; Trial Transcript at vol. 6, morning session,
27 (pressure from Jewish Defense League on Twentieth Century Fox, producers of fulia, to
promise in writing "that they would never employ me again"); id. at 38-41 (demands that
CBS fire Redgrave from Playing for Time); id at vol. 8, 28 (BSO was first to acquiesce in
pressures to fire Redgrave); id. at 28 (Redgrave told attorneys that her firing "must not be
overlooked. The Boston Symphony Orchestra has denied me participation in a purely artistic
performance for purely political reasons.").
55 See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text. Historians of the period often point to
radio commentator John Henry Faulk's libel suit against the publishers of a blacklist/scandal
sheet as the first successful legal action. See infra note 122.
1296	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 30:1283
could now be found to hold employers liable for, and deter them
from, political blacklisting.
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, or MCRA, was enacted in
1979 in response to the horrendous racial violence that accom-
panied court-ordered school desegregation in Boston's entrenched
ethnic neighborhoods. The statute has broad language, however,
that goes beyond racial violence and prohibits "any person or per-
sons, whether or not acting under color of law," from interfering
or attempting to interfere, "by threats, intimidation or coercion,
with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of
rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or
of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the common-
wealth."" Redgrave's attorneys made this still largely unconstrued
statute the centerpiece of her suit against the BSO in federal district
court. She also alleged breach of contract, "tortious repudiation" of
contract, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, a Reconstruction-era
civil rights law. 57
 Under the state civil rights count, Redgrave's com-
plaint claimed that the Orchestra had interfered with rights secured
to her by the first and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution, and articles 1, 10, 16, and 19 of the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights."
From the filing of Redgrave's complaint in October 1982 until
the time of trial in October 1984, Federal District Court Judge
56 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, §§ 1111, 111 (1986). Section 11H provides for enforcement
actions by the attorney general. Section 111 creates a private right of action for "injunctive
and other appropriate equitable relief . . ., including the award of compensatory money
damages," for "ialny person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution
or laws of the the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the
commonwealth, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described
in section 11 H."
57 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982). Red grave also sued "John Doe" and "Richard Roe" defendants
for common law conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference
with contractual rights, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982). On February I, 1983,
Federal District Court Judge Robert Keeton granted the Symphony's motion to dismiss the
tortious interference and 1986 claims, as well as Redgrave's demand for specific perfor-
mance of the contract. 557 F. Supp. 230, 235, 241 (D. Mass. 1983). The court rejected the
BSO's motion to dismiss the state civil rights act claim and its argument that Redgrave could
not prove any entitlement to consequential damages flowing from the contract breach. Id. at
233-34. Redgrave eventually abandoned her claims against the pseudonymous defendants.
Notice of Dismissal at I, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189
(D. Mass. 1985) (C.A. No. 82-3193—K).
58
 Article 1 is a general assurance of due process and equal protection (with an equal
rights amendment added in 1976); article 10 is a specific equal protection guarantee; article
16 assures free speech and press (see infra note 133); and article 19 protects the right to
assemble and petition for redress of grievances.
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Robert Keeton was largely on his own in construing the MCRA.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not begin to eluci-
date the mysteries of the statute until 1985. Faced in 1983 with
deciding the BSO's motion to dismiss Redgrave's MCRA count,
Judge Keeton rejected the Orchestra's argument that "the factual
allegations of the complaint demonstrate that the BSO did not
engage in threats, coercion, or intimidation, and that plaintiffs [Red-
grave and Vanessa Redgrave Enterprises, Ltd.] should not be al-
lowed to bootstrap a breach of contract claim into a civil rights
action . "59 Judge Keeton wrote:
Plaintiffs here have alleged, at the least, deprivations of
constitutionally protected speech adequate to suggest that
this case has a constitutional dimension that may implicate
the state civil rights act. Whether plaintiffs will be able to
demonstrate that the BSO, as distinguished from defen-
dants Doe and Roe, coerced Ms. Redgrave, is a matter
best left for another time. Though I am troubled by the
rather conclusory nature of the allegations of violation of
civil rights protected by state law, and by uncertainties of
the law defining those rights, I conclude that the motion
to dismiss the eighth claim should be denied. 6°
By the time of trial, Judge Keeton's troubles with the state civil
rights law had matured into serious doubts about its applicability to
Redgrave's case. At sidebar and lobby conferences during trial, he
repeatedly questioned whether acquiescence in the threatening and
coercive activities of others could violate the MCRA, and opined
that the statute's requirement of "threats, intimidation, or coercion"
implied a prohibition only of acts done with a "specific intent" to
deprive another of secured constitutional or civil rights. As he said
to Redgrave's attorney Marvin Wexler, "depriving a person of a
contractual right without the intent thereby to coerce and preclude
that person from exercising a civil right is not enough."'''
Wexler and Daniel Kornstein, plaintiff's lead counsel, disputed
Judge Keeton's contention that the statute required specific intent.
They argued that the case should go to the jury on alternative
theories of liability: either specific intent to deprive Redgrave of her
constitutional rights, or acquiescence in the retaliatory demands of
others. The specific intent theory would be based on trustee Irving
59 557 F. Supp. at 243.
GU Id.
G Trial "Transcript at vol. 13, noon lobby conference, 23-24.
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Rabb's deposition testimony that he deplored Redgrave's political
views. 62
Judge Keeton's resistance to the plaintiff's acquiescence theory
had its source in his scholarly grounding in the traditional verities
of common law. As the judge, a former Harvard Law professor,
told the attorneys:
The usual measure of liability for breach of contract would
be the performance fee, unless you show that the addi-
tional claim you're making is within the scope of the mea-
sure of damages under contract law because it was con-
cerned with consequences within the contemplation of the
parties .... You are all familiar with the Holmes bad man
theory of breach of contract, that there is a right if you
will or at least a legal privilege if you want to get involved
in Hohfeldian terminology, to buy out the contract, to
break it as long as you're willing to pay the damages ..
Now in order to overcome that argument that that's
the limit of the recovery for breach of contract, it seems
to me you will have to do either one of two things: offer
evidence from which the jury under a correct legal instruc-
tion could find that additional consequential damages
were within the contemplation of the parties or that you
are not limited to that usual measure of damages because
this was wrongful conduct in a sense beyond being merely
a breach of contract. 63
Judge Keeton thus viewed the MCRA, at least as interpreted
by Redgrave's side, as radically revising common law principles of
contract. Resisting such a departure from tradition, he ultimately
instructed the jury (which he employed in an advisory capacity for
purposes of the MCRA) that to prevail on the civil rights claim,
Redgrave had to show that the BSO "threatened, intimidated, or
coerced her for the purpose of interfering with, or attempting to
interfere with her civil right to free expression of her political
views," and that "[c]oercion may include depriving a person of a
62 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. In his deposition, read at trial, Rabb
readily acknowledged that "I am very much opposed to the PLO and .. , 1 differed very
much with [Redgrave] on her opinions." He added that this disagreement was not the reason
for his effort to persuade Morris to dump her: "1 was interested in the Boston Symphony
Orchestra and its relationship with the community and its ability to sustain itself, and that
was the thing that motivated me." Trial Transcript at vol. 3,72. The jury could have chosen
to disbelieve this disclaimer and concluded that Rabb's animus toward Redgrave's politics
motivated his successful effort to get her fired.
" Trial Transcript at vol. 13,42-49.
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contractual right to work in retaliation for the person's political
views with the purpose of causing that person to alter those views
or to become less outspoken." 64 Consequently, the judge did not
permit the plaintiff's acquiescence theory of liability to go to the
jury.
Thus, the jury's special verdict form began with a series of
questions directed specifically at the BSO's "state of mind." First,
Judge Keeton asked the jury whether the "only" or "primary" rea-
son for the BSO's cancellation was "that the agents who acted for
the BSO in making the decision to cancel disagreed with political
views that Redgrave had publicly expressed." Second, he asked
whether one or more of the "agents of the BSO" wanted to fire her
because of her political views and if so, whether the BSO "would
not have cancelled but for the influence" of those agents. Only if
one of these two state-of-mind prerequisites were met could the
jury even reach the further two questions that the judge also
thought material under the MCRA: whether the BSO "threaten[ed],
intimidate[d], or coerce[d]" Redgrave "for the purpose of interfer-
ing with or attempting to interfere with her civil right to free
expression of her political views"; and whether the BSO would not
have cancelled Oedipus Rex "but for the fact, if you find it to be a
fact, that one or more of the BSO's trustees opposed Vanessa Red-
grave's political views and wanted to retaliate against and punish
her for those views and to coerce and intimidate her into becoming
less outspoken." 65 Both of these latter two questions reiterated the
evil, retaliatory purpose or specific intent requirement that Judge
Keeton thought critical to the MCRA. Only if the jury answered
yes to one of the two could Redgrave prevail on her civil rights
claim.
Although Irving Rabb's statements provided some evidence,
albeit ambiguous, of retaliatory motivation, the overwhelming
weight of trial testimony from BSO management suggested that the
decisionmakers harbored little or no political animus against Red-
grave for her views; indeed, the Orchestra had hired her despite
them. The decision to cancel was in acquiescence to vociferous and
emotional protests from others, and was based, so they said, on
fears that the concerts would be disrupted, even that harm might
come to persons or musical instruments. 66
" Id. at vol. 14, 157 (instructions to the jury).
65 Verdict form, questions 1, 2A and 2B, 6, 7, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (C.A. No. 82-3193—K).
66 Morris acknowledged that the financial consequences of going forward with Redgrave
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Given this testimony, the jurors did not find the invidious mo-
tivation that Judge Keeton said was a prerequisite to MCRA liability,
and reluctantly found for the BSO on the MCRA claim.° They
expressed disquiet in an unusual post-verdict letter to the judge:
Your Honor:
We are writing to you for clarification as to the verdict,
and your charge to us .... There was one issue we thought
was clearly proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that we could find no way to express within the confines
of the verdict questions and your explanation to us as to
the parameters within which the law required we must
decide. We were convinced that there was indeed an ab-
rogation of Ms. Redgrave's civil rights by the BSO. We
were convinced that one of the primary reasons that the
BSO cancelled the arrangements for Vanessa Redgrave to
appear as narrator in the performance of Oedipus Rex was
that the agent(s) who acted for the BSO in making the
decision to cancel were willing to cooperate with members
of the broader Symphony community (i.e., season sub-
scribers, ticket holders, and supporters by monetary con-
tributions) in the desire by members of that broader corn-
nrainity to fire Ms. Redgrave because, and only because,
of the disagreement by that group with political views that
Ms. Redgrave had publicly expressed.
That group expressed its demands in terms of politics
and money — disagreement with Ms. Redgrave's politics
and threats, expressed or implied, to withhold money. The
BSO's agent(s) knew this to be so. They knew further, that
could have been serious. Trial Transcript at vol. 4, afternoon session, 19. He testified that
fundraising concerns "did play a role" in the decision making process but that the "issue that
we made the decision on was disruption." Id. at vol. 5, 48.
67
 They did award Redgrave consequential damages for breach of contract in the amount
of $100,000 (in addition to her $31,000 fee). The consequential damages were based on
Redgrave's testimony that her job offers after the BSO cancellation diminished in both
quantity and quality, and that her income consequently Fell. One producer, Theodore Mann,
testified that he dropped plans to feature Redgrave in an off-Broadway performance of
Shaw's Hearibreak House in response to news of the BSO cancellation of Oedipus Rex by "one
of the premier arts organizations" in the United States. Id. at vol. 9, afternoon session, 20-
25. Mann told Redgrave's agent that the BSO cancellation "would have a devastating effect
on Vanessa's career." Id. at 39. Director Sidney Lumet also described the likely career-
deadening effect of an incident like the BSO cancellation. Id. at vol. 9, afternoon session, 7-
9. A deposition by Redgrave's secretary, Silvana Sammassimo, indicated that viable lucrative
offers fell off after the cancellation. Id. at vol. 10, 43.
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to accede to these demands was to violate Ms. Reclgrave's
civil rights . . . 68
This letter became a prime illustration of Redgrave's two major
arguments on appeal. First, no specific intent or retaliatory motive
need be proved under the MCRA; acquiescence in the retaliatory
or discriminatory demands of others is enough. Second (after the
first point was finally won), the BSO's argument that it had a first
amendment right to cancel the concerts — because it feared that
audience disruption would interfere with the artistic integrity of the
performances — had no basis in the jury's factfindings.
The interrelated issues of acquiescence and specific intent were
the focus of Redgrave's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, and the appeal attracted amicus interest from the
Screen Actors Guild, the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts,
and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of the
Boston Bar Association. If acquiescence were accepted as a legiti-
mate defense under the MCRA, these groups argued, then em-
ployers could engage in discrimination on grounds of customer (or
co-employee) prejudice; and realtors or landlords could refuse to
show, sell, or rent to individuals based on their skin color, religion,
and so forth, in acquiescence to the animus of neighbors. Such
results would be intolerable; in fact, considerable precedent from
constitutional and civil rights law rejected just such an acquiescence
defense to civil rights liability. 6" Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a major
model for the MCRA, required no specially retaliatory state of
mind. Both statutes had criminal counterparts that explicitly did
contain such a specific intent standard."
A second issue on appeal arose out of judge Keeton's post-trial
decision to strip Redgrave of $100,000 that the jury had awarded
her in consequential contract damages. Keeton's novel theory had
been that the BSO could only have caused such damages through
"" Jury's post-verdict letter to The Honorable Robert E. Keeton 1, Redgrave v. Boston
Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Stipp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (C.A. No. 82-3193–K).
6" E.g., Pahnore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (race discrimination in child custody
decision — perceived societal burdens); Buchanan v. Watley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (race dis-
crimination in housing — private prejudices); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (sex .discrimination in employment — customer preference),
cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Sarni Original Dry Cleaners v. Cooke, 388 Mass. 611,447
N.E.2d 1228 (1983) (race discrimination in employment — neighborhood hostility),
7"See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982), the criminal counterpart to § 1983, and Mass. GEN. L. ch.
265, § 37 (1986), the criminal analog to §§ 11H and 111.
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an implied communication in its April 1, 1982 press release, that
Redgrave could not be prudently hired to perform in the United
States. This implied statement of opinion, Judge Keeton had said,
was first amendment-protected, by analogy to defamation law, un-
less Redgrave proved that it was made with actual malice or reckless
disregard for its falsity or truth.n
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit later
had little trouble disposing of Judge Keeton's defamation law anal-
ogy. The court held that acts such as contract breaches are not
transmuted into words (or symbolic acts) protected by the first
amendment simply because of the meanings that others may read
into them. 72 But on the MCRA issue that had so plagued judge,
parties, and jury below, the Court of Appeals was uneasy. Recog-
nizing the persuasiveness of the precedents involving acquiescence,
the appellate judges were nevertheless troubled by the prospect of
transplanting this law, developed partly in the context of constitu-
tional and civil rights violations by governments, into a statute that
reached private conduct." Accordingly, they invoked the certifica-
tion procedure,'" and asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court to answer two questions of state law:
7 ' He relied primarily on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1197-1203 (D. Mass. 1985), rev'd, 855 F.2d 888, 894-95 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 869 (1989). The cancellation announcement itself scrupulously
avoided any explicit statement about Redgrave.
72 855 F.2d at 894-95. This was the First Circuit's decision on rehearing, but on the
consequential damages point, it was unchanged from an earlier panel opinion in October
1987. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals did, however,
reduce the amount of Redgrave's consequential damages from $100,000 to $12,000, ruling
that the remainder entailed undue speculation by the jury. 855 F.2d at 896-900.
73 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had ruled in 1985, shortly after the
completion of post-trial proceedings in Redgrave, and well before the record was assembled
for appeal, that the MCRA indeed meant what it said, that it applied to conduct "whether
or not . under color of law." Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 181-82, 474 N.E.2d 1111,
1114-15 (1985). The court resolved the conundrum of how a private defendant could
interfere with rights that the state or federal constitutions, at least, articulated only as
limitations on governmental conduct, by adopting Justice Brennan's interpretation of "rights
secured" in his concurrence in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 778-79 (1966) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (right is secured by the Constitution if it "emanates from Loll . .. finds its
source in the Constitution").
74 Mass. S.J.C. Rule 1:03. See generally 17 C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4248 (1978) (certification as a more convenient and less harsh alternative
to so-called Pullman abstention where a federal court faces an uncertain or complex question
of state law), The Supreme Court expressed it delight in the virtues of certification in Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). See infra notes 158-89 and accompanying text for
discussion of the ultimately dispositive role of certification in Redgrave's case.
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(1) Under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, ... may a
defendant be held liable for interfering with the rights of
another person, by "threats, intimidation, or coercion," if
the defendant had no personal desire to interfere with
the rights of that person but acquiesced to pressure from
third parties who did wish to interfere with such rights?
(2) If a defendant can be held liable under the Massachu-
setts Civil Rights Act for acquiescence to third party pres-
sure, is it a defense for the defendant to show that its
actions were independently motivated by additional con-
cerns, such as the threat of extensive economic loss, phys-
ical safety, or particular concerns affecting the defendant's
course of business? 75
In his certification order accompanying these questions, First
Circuit Presiding Judge Frank Coffin explained his unease. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had recently ruled that the
MCRA was "coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the
Federal statute requires State action whereas its State counterpart
does not."7€ Under section 1983, it was well established that no
specific intent is required. But Judge Coffin said,
it is precisely because the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
extends to private actors that we are unsure as to whether
the Legislature intended the statute's coverage to extend
to private economic entities faced with external pressures
. . . . Given the potential differences between what may
be allowed state actors and private actors, we are unsure
whether in its statement regarding the coextensiveness of
§ 11H with § 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court intended
to adopt in toto all case law concerning § 1983 liability
stemming from acquiescence to third party pressure or
whether the Supreme Judicial Court would find the need
to fashion a different approach because of the private
actor coverage of § 11H."
These hesitations, as sketched by Judge Coffin in December
1985, were the proverbial handwriting on the wall.
75 Certification, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., No. 85-1305 (1st Cir,
Dec. 9, 1985), reproduced in the First Circuit's en bane decision, 855 F.2d 888, 902 (1988)
[hereinafter Certification],
75 Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 823, 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (1985).
" Certification at 5.
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III. OZAWA'S STORY
Seiji Ozawa, BSO music director for a decade at the time of
the Redgrave debacle, wanted a fully staged version of Oedipus Rex
for the BSO's centennial. He envisioned costumes, movement,
something beyond the Orchestra's usual line and befitting a 100th
anniversary celebration. 78
Ozawa first met Peter Sellars at Tanglewood in the summer of
1981; General Manager Morris and Artistic Administrator Bernell
had suggested him as stage director for the Stravinsky program.
The conductor was impressed with Sellars's stage sketch, particu-
larly his "brilliant idea" for Jessye Norman, as Jocasta, to be perched
on an industrial elevator that would rise and descend during por-
tions of her performance. Even more important for Ozawa was that
Sellars "knew music quite well."79
At their meeting seven months later in Paris, Ozawa again
found himself agreeing wholeheartedly with Sellars's approach to
Stravinsky's stately work. "He said" (Ozawa testified), "'please, Seiji,
watch out to do exactly what Stravinsky wrote.' And that absolutely
I agreed . . . . In other words, music is so important for this piece
and Stravinsky wrote everything so precisely.""
Ozawa left the choice of narrator to Sellars, Morris, and Ber-
nell. "I am terrible for no music thing, like theater people . . . I
don't remember names of movie actors." 81
 He had not heard of
Vanessa Redgrave, and so called his wife, who was in Japan at the
time, to consult her. "She said it's a fantastic choice." 82 Ozawa was
not able to test that opinion until after the BSO had cancelled the
Stravinsky concerts. Redgrave came to Boston to protest and Ozawa
saw her on TV. He thought, "this is the perfect voice. But already
at that time . . . everything was gone."83
Ozawa first heard about the crisis in Boston from Bernell and
Morris. Though his testimony was hazy, the impression he received
in long distance telephone calls from Tuesday through early Thurs-
day morning, March 30 through April 1, was that the Oedipus Rex
performances would certainly be disrupted on account of Red-
78
 Trial 'rranscript at vol. 4, morning session, 8.
79 1d. at 11-12.
" Id. at 15.
aj Id. at 16.
" Id. at 16-17.
" Id. at 17.
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grave's appearance, and police would be lining the aisles of Sym-
phony Hal1. 84 He recalled Bernell and Morris speculating about
bomb threats, or at least stink bombs. Moreover, his managers told
him, some of the musicians had protested Redgrave's hiring and
were threatening not to perform." Bernell said that Redgrave had
made a political speech when she received her Academy Award for
Julia; Ozawa's impression was that she could well do so again in
response to a hostile audience."
Daniel Kornstein cross-examined Ozawa on this point:
Q. Now, in which conversation did Mr. Bernell say that
Vanessa Redgrave would talk back to the audience from
the stage?
I" Id. at 38-60. For Ozawa, the calls blurred together; he could not remember "which is
first, which is second." Id. at 44.
The telephone protests had become increasingly abrasive as the week wore on. Judith
Gassner, then assistant director of promotion, found them "upsetting, unsettling." One caller
told her: "You will mourn for this. You will be sorry." Id. at vol. 11, 163-64. Another
protester said that his parents had died at Auschwitz and that the PLO was committed "to
the destruction of the state of Israel and the Jewish people." Id. at voi. 12, 61 (testimony of
Promotion Director Caroline Smedvig). Still another: "This will haunt you. You will mourn.
There will be trouble. 'There is trouble wherever this woman goes," Id. at 63. Smedvig was
"very shaken up," she was "frantic trying to keep my own staff calm and functioning." Id. at
62, 77,
85 Trial Transcript at vol. 4, morning session, 52-53, 55-56. Redgrave's counsel disputed
the notion that there was any reasonable basis to anticipate disruption. Producer Ismail
Merchant testified that during the filming of The Bostonians on location in Roston in the fall
of 1983, there were no disruptions despite heavy publicity and consistently large crowds of
observers. "Christopher Reeve [Redgrave's co-star] was rather shy and Miss Redgrave would
take the autograph books and get Christopher Reeve to autograph them." Id. at vol. 8, 139—
42.
"11 Id. at vol. 4, morning session, 36, 38-40, 44, 50, 55. Redgrave explained to the jury
the circumstances of her Academy Award acceptance speech. Julia, the character she had
played, was a socialist and a member of the underground resistance to the Nazis, an individual
with whom both Redgrave and her co-star, Jane Fonda, could obviously identify. Id. at vol.
6, morning session, 21. The JDL's burning of Redgrave's effigy outside the auditorium on
award night stirred her to explain in her acceptance speech "that the work had meant a very
great deal to me and Jane - Fonda and that we have beli zed profoundly in the principles for
which Julia died .... [We believed] that you must fight against anti-Semitism and Fascism."
Id. at 27-30. She referred in her speech to theJDL as "Zionist hoodlums," urged the industry
not to succumb to the League's updated demands for a blacklist and "a return to Mc-
Carthyism," and "promised that 1 would continue to fight for the the principles that
Julia had." Id. at 30-31.
Sidney Lumet, who had been at the award ceremony, told the jury that initially some in
the audience thought Redgrave's speech anti-Semitic because of the reference to "Zionist
hoodlums," but that by the end she was cheered because "she went on ... with great passion
thanking the Academy membership for not being influenced by . . her politically contro-
versial position. And at the end of the speech, 1 remember an enormous, enormous burst of
applause, and it may have even been a standing ovation." Id. at vol. 9, morning session, 44.
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A. I don't remember.
. . . I think that moment he told me first time that she
made a speech at Academy.
. . . And I thought that's not place to make speech.
Q. And it was told to you that Ms. Redgrave would do
just that, speak from the stage as narrator?
A. Ask her.
Q. Maestro, I'm just asking, were you told that by Mr.
Bernell?
A. I think it was a possibility.
Q. Based on what?
A. Maybe that Academy thing, maybe. Or she maybe —
she maybe said it to Bill by telephone.
Q. Are you just guessing now?
A. Yes . . . . I mean, not guessing. Just something in my
mind remember she talked to him, and he got the impres-
sion this may have some reaction from audience . . . . And
in that conversation could be that then she doesn't mind
that, you know ... she is expecting that; and she could
talk back to them, don't worry, that kind of thing. Could
be that conversation. 87
The situation saddened Ozawa, but he told Morris and Bernell
that he was sure Redgrave would understand the problem and offer
to withdraw. 88 He was surprised to learn after a telephone call late
Wednesday night that she would not. 89 It was finally, Ozawa said,
87 Id. at vol. 4, morning session, 67-71. Bernell and Morris denied specifically telling
Ozawa that Redgrave would talk back to the audience during the performance. Id. at vol.
11, 101 (Bernell testimony), vol. 5, 41 (Morris testimony). But Bernell did say "that I could
not assure him that she would not speak from the stage of Symphony Hall other than the
words she was assigned to speak as an actress." Although he had no basis in Redgrave's past
performances to make the suggestion, he explained, "I was thinking of the Academy Awards
event." Id, at vol, I I, 101. See also id. at 123 (Bernell never had impression Redgrave would
make a political statement during the performances). Bernell testified that he told Ozawa
the problems "seemed to be insurmountable." Id. at 73.
Morris told Ozawa about his Tuesday meeting with Police Commissioner Jordan (see
supra note 37 and accompanying text), his conversations with managers of Carnegie Hall in
New York City, and his conclusion that disruption, at least in the form of yelling, was likely
during the concert. Id. at vol. 4, afternoon session, 52, vol. 5, 41.
" Trial Transcript at vol. 4, afternoon session, 53 (Morris testimony).
8' Id, at vol. 4, morning session 47-50 (Ozawa testimony). Bernell testified that he reached
Redgrave on Thursday early morning London time. He told her the protest calls were
"heated" and "very troublesome." She took the news "dispassionately" and urged him not to
he alarmed. "[S]he seemed genuinely to believe" that the protests would subside, told him
that in Australia recently there had been a bomb scare before a showing of her film, Occupied
Palestine, but that the performance had gone forward. "'How do you think you would feel if
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his decision to cancel the entire Stravinsky program and proceed
instead with Berlioz' Requiem, a piece that the Tanglewood chorus
already knew wel1. 9° There ensued his remarkable telephone debate
with Sellars on April 1, just before the cancellation was announced.
In this conversation, said the conductor, Sellars acknowledged
that the Orchestra was "expecting some noise, . . . even some police,"
but still wanted to proceed. "I said that's crazy . . . [M]usic goes to
your ear and then go directly to your feeling . . . . To do that, we
have to have silence," particularly for the Symphony of Psalms, "which
is one of the most pure music and most quiet music . ." 9 '
Sellars pressed on. He said, according to Ozawa, that the opera
would become more lively and interesting
when we have noise from audience or police is around
the theater; he thought that is excitement. And that really
absolutely crazy. I think he was very hot that day . . . I
was amazed that he changed from purely music[al] point
of view ... I do not want somebody to use Symphony
Hall for political issue. I feel everybody should have
freedom to have political wish, but they should not be
involved with a great piece of art	 Peter had a different
idea . .	 . Peter thought politic[s] and music must be
together, live together. I'm absolutely against it."'
you were shot. dead on the stage of Symphony Hall?"' Bernell said he asked her. And her
response was, 'I our sure that the Boston police will apprehend my killer.' ....She said, 'Let's
get on with it.' And I just did not seen, to he able to awaken her to what. I perceived as a
very real danger to her, to our audiences, to everybody in the building." Id. at vol. 11,83—
87.
kedgrave fur her part believed that Bernell was exaggerating the danger. She testified
that she reminded him that CBS had not caved in to similar pressures over her role in Playing
for Time. Despite the emotional temperature of those protests, there had been no violence,
but only peaceful picketing. Even when she had shown Occupied Palestine in Australia and
Sydney Town Hall had received a bomb threat., the show went forward after the police
checked the hall. Id. at vol. 6, morning session, 103-05. Redgrave told Bernell that she had
never had a performance disrupted, and did not believe "that there are barbarians who
would start screaming and shouting in Symphony Hall during Oedipus Rex." Id. at vol. 7,
afternoon session, 30-34.
Id. at vol. 4, morning session, 24 (Ozawa testimony).
" t id. at 20-21.
.92 Id. at 23-25. Bernell testified to a similar debate with Sellars. When the management
realized there would probably "be boos and catcalls and hissing and stamping or feet .
police in the hall . . . [and the[ possibility that somebody could get hurt," Sellars suggested
shilling the concept of the production because Oedipus Rex is, after all, a political play, "'Peter,
don't be an opportunist,— Bernell said he responded. Lining Symphony Hall with police "is
nut what we set out to do. It's not what we discussed with ,Iessye Norman and Seiji Ozawa."
Id. at vol. I I, 63-64. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. for a discussion of Sellars's
interest in rendering classic art relevant to contemporary reality.
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Ozawa told Sellars that he would not mix music "with political
issue . . . [A]rt and music is fragile." Sellars replied, "'Decision is of
course, Seiji, yours. But I am asking you to keep going.""-'s
Kornstein cross-examined Ozawa extensively on this point.
Ozawa had been conducting Fidelio in Paris at the time of the crisis.
Q. Would you tell us in a minute what the theme of Fidelio
is?
A. The theme of the Fidelio is, how you call — that's a
political kind of a game —
Q. It's about liberation of prisoners, political prisoners.
A. Yes, it is. Prisoner the very brave woman, put men's,
how you call — to become like man, young man, to save
her lover or, I think, husband, I don't remember, to save
from jail. At end, the good man comes, clear everything,
so everybody become free, that kind of a story.
Q. And you mentioned that Fidelio is a political —
A. Yes.
Q. — opera?
A. Fidelio is, you know, against bad king who — bad man
Q. — who is oppressing his people.
A. That's right.
Q. And it's about the struggle against the oppressor.
A. Yes.
Q. And eventual freedom and liberation.
A. That's right. Bad story, though.
Q. But beautiful music?
A. Ah, yes. The story is stupid, really . . . Beethoven was
a great composer, but he did not choose ... he could do
better if he was to choose a better libretto . . . . When I
conduct, 1 felt that too. And many people agreed with
me.
9s
	Transcript at vol. 4, morning session, 21. The rebuttal testimony of Thelma
Holt, a British producer, provided a contrast to the attitude of Ozawa and the BSO man-
agement on the issue of disruption threats. When the Rustavelli Company, the USSR's leading
Shakespearean troupe, came to London in 1981, just after the Soviet Union invaded Af-
ghanistan, "Iwle had bomb threats for the first ten days every night." Once she had to clear
the theater while the police scoured it. "It was extremely costly to the British taxpayer, and
it was a bore for all of us." But cancellation would have been unthinkable:
1 mean, if every time some loony-bean rings you up and says he is going to
drop a bomb on you — it is an occupational hazard when you run a public
service.. . But we could never have taken the dangerous course of canceling
a performance; because if we did that, we would have no hotels open, we would
have no theaters open. I mean, we'd have nothing.
Id. at vol. 13, afternoon session, 10-13.
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Q. Now, while the story may not have been exactly as good
as you would have liked, Maestro, do you think the theme
is noble?
A. Yes. I mean, . . . at the end, prisoner become free, and
everybody very happy, you know.
Q. So in your conducting of Fidelio, there was a blending
of music and politics?
A. Ah, now. No, no. I think you approach — 1 know what
you want to say. I think that's ... very stupid you are. But
don't waste time talking about Fidelio, because ... nothing
to do with this case . . . .
Q. Maestro, didn't you say that you do not like to mix
politics and music?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. And do you agree that Fidelio has a political theme?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever conducted Tosca?
A. Yes.
Q. Does Tosca have a political theme?
A. Yes.




A. Because in all this has a political theme, it's same as
Oedipus Rex, you know.
Q. Yes.
A. Oedipus Rex is very political becayse people say at the
end, my dear Oedipus Rex — he is, you know, he lost his
eyes . . . cut his own eyes, became blind. And then he is
going — I think he's going to die, but, you know, disap-
pearing, chorus says, "Adieu, adieu, By-bye, Oedipus. We
loved you." That was the last, how you say, narrator's word
. . . . And then soft down, soft down, soft down. And that
is, you know, political.
I told you, [in] our life politics is always connecting
and music, of course, goes in. But what I'm saying is
performing art of music to directly use is very cheap way
to me. What I say is very dangerous to use that . . .
Beethoven wanted to have free — those times was very dif-
ficult time, I'm sure; so he had this idea, that political. And
what we are facing this political is not the same thing .. .
Q. Don't we live in difficult times now?
A. Yes, but it is not right to solve this way. People need
music. Because of difficulty, people need music. [P]art of
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music is to . . . direct to people's feeling . . . when life
becomes so noisy, life becomes so busy, life becomes hating
many people each other, when that time we need music.
Q. Music can be a healing, unifying force?
A. Right, yes.
Q. Should Fidelio not be played if there are some people
in the audience who disagree with its theme? . . . And who
might boo?
A. Yes. I got boo.
Q. You did get booed?
A. Oh, sure.
Q. When was that?
A. In Paris, but it's not because of theme. Because of some
singers performing was not good. Boo is always very pop-
ular . . .
Q. Booing is a common occurrence in opera.
A. Yes, sure.
Q. And the performance continued?
A. No. Boo comes usually at the end of a performance, I
hope.
. . . [I]t doesn't happen often in Symphony Hall here, but
that happen quite often in Europe; in opera house, for
instance.
Q. Now, Mr. Ozawa, my question was: Should Fidelio not
be played if there are people in the audience who disagree
with its theme?
A. It will not happen, I assure you.
Q. That everybody will agree with the political theme of
Fidelio?
A. Because the story is so stupid. It's not serious, you
know.
Q. Well, for example, suppose during the Nazi era the
German symphony wanted to put on Fidelio.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And suppose some people hired by the government
were going to protest —
A. Which government?
Q. The Nazi government at the time.
A. Why?
Q. It occurs to me that they might not like the theme of
Fidelio.
A. Why you think so? Seriously . . . . Why German gov-
ernment don't like Fidelio story? Tell me. It doesn't just
happen.
Q. Just assume. Indulge me.
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A. That assume is very poor.
Q. Assume that there are some people in an audience who
do not like the theme of Tosca.
A. That's very unlikely, and you shouldn't assume — you
should not waste time with everybody here. You are ap-
proaching very wrong, you know. You can ask me any-
thing, but don't waste time, because we are facing, you
know, very particular problem. 94
Whoever was thought to have prevailed in this extended dia-
logue on the complex intersection between art and politics, ulti-
mately the cross-examination did not serve Redgrave's cause. For
whatever the merits of Ozawa's artistic philosophy, a number of
appellate judges found in his testimony a demonstration of his
unimpeachable constitutional right, as musical director of a sym-
phony orchestra, to decide the aesthetic terms on which it would
perform.
IV. BLACKLISTING
On the tenth day of trial, plaintiff's counsel attempted to in-
troduce in evidence an affidavit by the recently-deceased play-
wright, Lillian Hellman. In 1952, Hellman had agreed to testify
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities about her
own past left-wing political activities but had refused to talk about
her friends. Her most famous line — "I cannot and will not cut my
conscience to fit this year's fashions" — signaled a dramatic point
of resistance in the years when political blacklisting, fostered and
inspired by HUAC and other inquisitorial committees, dominated
arts and entertainment in the United States.`''
94 Id. at vol. 4, morning session, 27-34.
95 There is extensive literature on the era in post-World War II American history when
rampant and often hysterical anti-communist attitudes led to purges and loyalty oaths in
virtually all areas of employment. On witchhuming and blacklisting in the arts and enter-
tainment specifically, see, e.g., C. BELFRAGE, 'FHE AMERICAN INQUISITION (1973); E. BENTLEY.
THIRTY YEARS OF TREASON (1971); A. BEsstE, INQUISITION IN EDEN (1967); D. CAUTE,
GREAT FEAR (1979); L. CEPLAIR & S. ENGLAND, THE INQUISITION IN HOLLYWOOD (1979); J.
COGLEY, REPORT ON BLACKLISTING (195(1); F. COOK, "THE. NIGICTMARE DECADE (1971); J.H.
FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL (1964); G. KAHN, HOLLYWOOD ON TRIAL (1948); S. KANEER, A JOURNAL
(IF THE PLAGUE YEARS (1973); V. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1981); M. SCHUMACH, THE FACE
ON THE CUTEING ROOM FLOOR (1964); D. TRUMISO, THE .FIME OF THE TOAD (1972); L.
FIELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME 90 (quoting her letter to HUAC) (1977).
The law review literature is less extensive. See, e.g., Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "Political
Black Listing" in the Entertainment Industry, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (1956); Note, Political
Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE U. 567 (1965);
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Hellman's affidavit was first entered in the Redgrave record in
the spring of 1984, in opposition to the BSO's motion for summary
judgment. Daniel Kornstein has described his November 1983 visit
to Hellman to discuss the case. She was recovering from a stroke,
but nevertheless was mentally alert:
She already understood the essentials of Redgrave's suit,
and was full of ideas and suggestions. With biting and
uninhibited language, Hellman compared her own plight
during the McCarthy era to Redgrave's situation. She
talked of her own suffering at the hands of the blacklisters,
and I felt as if I were taking part in an oral history proj-
ect. 96
In her affidavit, Hellman asserted that she considered herself
"an expert witness on blacklists." She recounted how, as a result of
her 1952 appearance before HUAC, in which she refused to testify
about other people's political activities, she was unable to work at
scretnwriting and suffered a decline in income from $140,000 to,
eventually, $10,000 a year. The blacklist operated secretly, yet was
very effective. "In my experience," she concluded, "and particularly
in light of the fact that the BSO is a leading artistic institution in
this country, there is a cause and effect relationship between the
BSO cancellation and what happened to Ms. Redgrave's career."'
Judge Keeton did not allow the affidavit into evidence at trial,
primarily because of relevance, not hearsay, problems. 98 As he said,
The burden of the affidavit is blacklisting. There is no
conceivable way that what occurred here would constitute
blacklisting. Blacklisting involves concerted action. There
is no charge, there is no evidence, that the BSO has en-
gaged in concerted action with anybody else . . . . So
insofar as there is evidence in this affidavit regarding
Note, Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of Employers to Discharge Suspected Subversives,
62 YALE LT 954 (1953).
b Kornstein, Lillian Hellman and the Law, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 29,1986, at 2.
See also Kornstein, The Case Against Lillian Hellman: A LiterarylLegal Defense, 57 FORD L. Rev.
683,721-23 (1989).
97 Affidavit of Lillian Hellman, Redgrave v. Roston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (C.A. No. 82-3193—K).
a
	
804(a)(5) permits the admission of hearsay from dead or otherwise unavailable
witnesses where the statement has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," is "evidence
of a material Fact," and is "more probative on the point ... than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts."
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blacklisting, it's totally irrelevant to this trial and would be
highly prejudicia1. 99
Despite Judge Keeton's view on this point, testimony in addition
to Peter Sellars's indicated that blacklisting was much on the minds
of the BSO decisionmakers during the frantic last days of March
1982. Kornstein had Judith Gordon Gassner, the Orchestra's Assis-
tant Director of Promotion in 1982, read from her deposition re-
garding a conversation among herself, Sellars, Bernell, and Pro-
motion Director Caroline Smedvig: they had agreed that "we would
really be blacklisting her and that it was just bad; we really shouldn't
do it ... And that we shouldn't bow to any kind of pressure from
the community." 10°
Movie director Sidney Lumet also testified about blacklisting:
the mid- to late-1970s controversy over Redgrave's pro-PLO activity
was easing at the time that the BSO fueled its renewal by acquiescing
in the pressures to fire her.
The memory of the event that actually created a problem
tends to fade, except, of course, this was not true during
the McCarthy time . . . a period lasting all through the
'50s in which the blacklisting of actors, directors and writ-
ers was official — a list actually existed in movies and
television and those people could not find any work.'"'
Similarly, Kornstein argued in his summation that the "early
fifties ... period is still a shame to our national conscience; . .
[WIe don't want to start down that path again." 102
Despite Judge Keeton's view, the issue of political blacklisting
emerged full-blown on appeal. Redgrave and the amici who sup-
o° Trial Transcript at vol. 10, morning session, 60. judge Keeton's definition of black-
listing was arguably too narrow. See Legal Aspects of 'Political Black Listing', supra note 95, at
263 ribIlack listing is not a term of settled factual or legal meaning, and is used here, for
want of a better term, to describe in the aggregate various practices of' employers in the
entertainment industry in utilizing what might be called 'political' tests for employment, and
various activities of extra-industry private individuals or groups with respect to the employ-
ment of particular individuals in the industry").
100 Trial Transcript at vol. 12, morning session, 15. Morris testified that blacklisting "may
have" been discussed, but he did not see how concerns about the Orchestra's ability to mount
the concerts was blacklisting. Id, at vol. 5, 43. Bernell concurred. When Sellars argued that
firing Redgrave would amount to blacklisting, Bernell testified, "I was furious . . I said,
'Peter, this is not a blacklisting issue „ . If we wanted to blacklist Vanessa Redgrave, we
wouldn't have engaged Vanessa Redgrave.'" Id. at vol. I I, 65. Sellars testified that Bernell
had raised the specter of blacklisting at a late evening meeting on Monday, March 29. Id. at
vol. 2, 44.
16 ' Id. at vol. 9, afternoon session, 7-9.
M, at vol. 14, 71.
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ported her pressed the historical analogy. The Civil Liberties Union/
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights brief contended that blacklist-
ing did not require concerted action: its essence was "acquiescence
to third party pressure," exactly the situation in the Redgrave case
and exactly the activity that the trial court had erroneously ruled
was not a basis for MCRA liability.'" As these amid wrote:
From 1947 to the early 1960's, major employers ac-
quiesced in the threats and demands of others such as
Congressional committees and private pressure groups
. . . The blacklist was economically motivated: employers
feared picket lines, bad publicity, advertisers' and lobby-
ists' pressures, or other "controversy" that might diminish
box office receipts ... .
As one observer of the blacklist years said, "1 think if
at the very beginning the heads of the studios had stood
up to the Committee, none of this would have happened,
or it would have happened on a very reduced scale."°4
Amici Curiae Brief of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of the
Boston Bar Association and the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Redgrave v. Boston
Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888 (No. 85-1305). See supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
1i4 Id. at 20 n.17 (quoting 1). CAUTE and V. NAVASKY, and citing J. COGLEY, D. CAUTE,
and S. KANFER, supra note 95). In an addendum, the Amici brief quoted from the infamous
"Waldorf Declaration" of 1947, in which the major movie producers announced that not
only would they discharge the Hollywood Ten, directors and screenwriters who in October
1947 had refused to answer HUAC's questions, but that Iv* will not knowingly employ a
Communist or a member of any party or group which advocates the overthrow of the
Government of the United States by force, or by any illegal or unconstitutional method."
Less than a month earlier, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America had
assured the writers and actors who had been subpoenaed by HUAC that "faus long as I live
1 will never be a party to anything as un-American as a blacklist." W. GOODMAN, THE
CoNosrrrra: 217-18 (1969); S. KANFER, supra note 95 at 41-42; G. KAHN, .tillpra note 95 at 6.
Amici argued that the industry's quick reversal illustrated that the producers had acquiesced
in the "politically-motivated punitive purposes" of others. Amici curiae brief, supra note 103,
addendum 2. See also Young v. Motion Picture Assoc. of Arn., Inc., 299 F.2d 119, 120 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (suggesting that "protests by members of Congress and the public, , .. posing a
threat to the economic well-being" of a film company, would justify refusal to deal with
politically suspect writers and actors); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216
F.2c1 844, 851, 853 (9th Cir, 1954) (holding that public reaction to screenwriter's refusal to
testify before HUAC regarding his political associations justified terminating his contract
under the contract's "morals" clause), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 944 (1955); Loew's, Inc. v. Cole,
185 F.2d 641, 649, 658 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951) (same); United
Electrical Radio arid Machine Workers v. General Electric Co., 127 F. Supp. 934, 939 (D.D.C.
1954) (holding that criticism from stockholders and customers, as well as "unrest among
fellow employees," justified GE in firing fir "obvious cause" workers who had relied upon
the fifth amendment during interrogation by congressional committees).
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Similarly, Kornstein and Wexler's brief to the First Circuit dis-
puted the trial court's ruling that political criteria were permissible
in employment decisions. Judge Keeton had written in his post-trial
decision rejecting Redgrave's MCRA claim:
The law does not forbid an entity . . . from taking account
of recognized differences among its members and patrons
regarding controversial political issues . . . . [I]t is not
illegal for a private entity to make a choice not to contract
with an artist for a performance if its agents believe that
the artist's appearance under their sponsorship would be
interpreted by others as in some degree a political state-
ment.'"5
Kornstein and Wexler argued that political tests for employment,
of the type apparently sanctioned by Judge Keeton in this passage,
were legal in Poland and other totalitarian countries, and in Nazi
Germany where artistic organizations "proved their political 'purity'
by firing and refusing to re-employ those opposed to fascist ideol-
ogy."'" The same mentality prevailed in the U.S. during the "scoun-
drel time" of the blacklist: the brief cited Hellman and other
authors 107 to illustrate that blacklisting resulted from acquiescence
to the demands of red-baiters.'"
This Court should make it clear that the law has made
great strides since the early 1950's and that meaningful
legal redress for such political coercion now exists. The
trial court's dangerous rulings of law should be reversed,
and its open invitation to return to the McCarthy era
should be turned aside.'"9
105 Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Mass.
1985). Because the judge had used the jury in an advisory capacity for the purpose of the
MCRA claim, it was up to him to render the actual decision.
lull Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Vanessa Redgrave and Vanessa Redgrave Enterprises,
Ltd., 5, Reclgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2(1 888 (1st Cir. 1985) (No.
85-1305).
"7 See supra note 95.
1°N
	
of Plaintiffs.Appellants„stipra note 106, at 6 (quoting K. FOLEY, THE POLITICAL
BLACKLIST IN THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY 422 (1979)). See also Cole V. Loew's, I nc., 8 F.R.D.
508, 523 (S.D.Cal. 1948) ("agents or investigators" of FRJAC "insisted that certain writers
. should be discharged"), rev'd, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950). Redgrave repeated her
historical arguments to the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court after the First Circuit
certified to it two questions of law under the state civil rights act. See supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
109 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 106, at 6.
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Consistent with this position, Kornstein responded to a question
during the first oral argument in the First Circuit on Redgrave's
appeal by asserting that for purposes of the actress's free speech
rights, it made no difference that the case involved a contract can-
cellation rather than a refusal to hire. That is, refusing to hire an
artist because of her political beliefs is as unacceptable as firing her
for the same reason. One practical difference, of course, is that in
refusal-to-hire situations the victim often does not know that he or
she was even being considered. Under the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act,"° it is difficult to imagine an individual being threat-
ened, intimidated, or coerced — i.e., punished for the past exercise
of political freedoms, or chilled in their future exercise — if he or'
she does not even know that an employer has made a politically-
motivated decision. But, from the perspective of freedom of speech,
a refusal to hire is as destructive of first amendment values as is a
discharge from employment in response to political pressures.
As Redgrave's brief suggested, legal efforts to challenge black-
listing in the 1950s were not notably successful. The Hollywood
Ten, directors and screenwriters who had resisted HUAC's political
inquisition, lost their first amendment-based appeals from their
convictions for contempt of Congress,"' and their suits against their
employers for breach of contract fared no better.
The film studios justified firing the Ten under contractual
"morals" clauses that typically obligated those in the studios' employ
to avoid conduct that (in the words of the Loew's contract) would
"° See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Whether in fact cancellation in these
circumstances amounted to coercion, as Judge Keeton had originally ruled that it might (see
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text) was not an issue on appeal but crept into the
appellate interchange between state and federal courts, and ultimately did affect the outcome.
See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
"' Lawson v. United States and Trumbo v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950). The Court of Appeals determined that IIUAC's questions
were justified, despite their intrusion into the freedom of political association, because
No one can doubt in these chaotic times that the destiny of all nations hangs in
balance in the current ideological struggle between communistic-thinking and
democratic-thinking peoples of the world It is equally beyond dispute that
the motion picture industry plays a critically prominent role in the molding of
public opinion and that motion pictures are, or arc capable of being, a potent
medium of propaganda dissemination which may influence the minds of mil-
lions of American people. This being so, it is absurd to argue, as these appellants
do, that questions asked men who, by their authorship of the scripts, vitally
influence the ultimate production of motion pictures seen by millions, which
questions require disclosure of whether or not they are or ever have been
Communists, are not pertinent questions.
176 F.2d at 53. Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari.
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"tend to degrade [them] in society or bring [them] into public
hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or . . . tend to shock, insult or
offend the community or ridicule public morals or decency, or
prejudice the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio
industry in general."" 2 In three cases arising from contract cancel-
lations under these morals clauses — Loews, Inc. v. Cole, Scott v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner
— juries found for the plaintiffs. But the Ninth Circuit reversed
the Cole and Lardner judgments, on grounds that ranged from trivial
to picayune, and in Scott the trial judge ruled that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence.
In Cole, the appellate court found fault in four aspects of the
trial court's charge to the jury and one ruling excluding evidence.
It also reversed a factual finding that Loew's had waived reliance
on the morals clause by employing Cole for more than a month
after his HUAC testimony." 3 The court remanded for a new trial
but, in rejecting Cole's claim that he deserved a judgment in his
favor as a matter of law, made clear its view that a jury might easily
infer from Cole's refusal to answer HUAC's questions that he had
been a Communist, and that "because, even in 1947, a large segment
of the public did look upon Communism and Communists as things
of evil, we think it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that in acting
as he did Cole did not breach his agreement . . . "4
In Lardner, four years later, the Court of Appeals left open
even less possibility of a plaintiff's judgment on retrial. In reversing
the jury verdict on grounds of perceived evidentiary errors, the
Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954
(1951); see also Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc., 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(affirming denial of preliminary injection under antitrust laws to restrain blacklisting), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962); Independent Productions Corp. v, Loew's, Inc., 283 F.2d 730
(2nd Cir. 1960) (reversing dismissal of antitrust suit by blacklisted producers of Salt of the
Earth alleging industry-wide boycott of the film); Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d
87 (9th Cir, 1956) (breach of contract), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939 (1957); Twentieth Century.
Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954) (same), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 944
(1955); Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 183, 298 P.2d 152 (1956) (affirming dismissal
of suit by 23 blacklisted artists for malicious interference with employment), cert. dismissed,
355 U.S. 597 (1958); RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., v. ,farrico, 128 Cal. App. 2d 172, 274 P.2d
928 (1954) (declaratory judgment action by employer seeking to deprive writer of screen
credit), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 928 (1955). A 1965 student note reports that none of these suits
generated helpful precedents, though some cases settled out of court. Note, Political Black-
listing, supra note 95, at 569 n.8.
13 Locw's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 658-62 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954
(1951).
"4 Id. at 649. The Ninth Circuit's speculation was ironic in view of the jury's specific
finding that Cole's conduct did not violate the "morals" clause in his contract.
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court essentially ruled as a matter of law that the company was
within its rights under the morals clause in cancelling the contract
after Lardner had refused to answer HUAC's questions." 5
In Scott, a jury again found for the plaintiff but the trial court,
having apparently received the Ninth Circuit's message in Cole and
Lardner, granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence. " 6
 The judge then ruled for the
company, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without analysis on
the authority of Lardner, noting however that Scott's "frontal attack
on our previous two cases, particularly Lardner's . . . is done with
some persuasiveness."' ' 7
In Redgrave some thirty years later, the BSO's reliance on lan-
guage in its contract permitting it to cancel because of "circum-
stances beyond its reasonable control"" 8 was reminiscent of the
morals clause defenses of blacklist-era cases like Cole, Scott, and
Lardner. Like the juries in those earlier suits, the Redgrave jury
rejected the defense,"9
 and the BSO did not press this point on
" 5
 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 852 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 944 (1955). The judgment for Lardner was reversed because the
appellate court reasoned that: (1) Lardner's testimony that Fox manager Darryl Zannuck
had said "he was not interested in a man's politics" was improperly admitted; (2) evidence
of Lardner's conviction for contempt of Congress was improperly excluded; and (3) the trial
court's instruction on "moral turpitude" was too narrow. Id. at 849, 850, 852.
"6 Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 88 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 939 (1957).
IL? Id, at 91. See also RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., v. Jarrico, 128 Cal. App. 2d at 174-75,
274 P.2d at 929-30 (affirming judgment that writer "had become an object of public disgrace
and ill will"; rejecting argument that "Nile assertion of a constitutional right cannot be in
violation of public conventions and morals"). On the cases of this era generally, see Note,
Political Black Listing, supra note 95, at 270-71, 272, 275; Note, Loyalty and Private Employment,
supra note 95 at 958-82.
Even a California statute specifically forbidding employers from "fclontrolling or di-
recting or tending to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees," did
not help: the California Supreme Court ruled in 1946 that the law did not address discharges
where the employee's "loyalty to the United States has not been established to the satisfaction
of the employer." Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 485, 171 P.2d
21, 24 (1946). Although the Lockheed holding rejected the company's constitutional attack on
the statute in the context of a suit by former employees, this dicta, by bestowing on employers
broad permission to discharge based on subjective suspicions of "disloyalty," essentially elim-
inated the statute as a protection for blacklisted workers. See Wilson v. Loew's, Inc. 142 Cal.
App. 2d at 189, 298 P.2d at 157 (citing Lockheed for proposition that "political" activity implies
"orderly conduct of government, not revolution"). Numerous other state and federal laws,
including the National Labor Relations Act, provided potential sources of legal protection
for victims of blacklisting, but, although occasionally helpful in the pre-McCarthy period,
were by the early 1950's rendered virtually useless by the courts. See Note, Loyalty and Private
Employment, supra note 95, at 975-79.
aae See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
"5
 The jury did so by answering "no" to a special question on this point. Verdict form,
supra note 65, at question 3.
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appeal. One might thus argue that Redgrave demonstrates progress
in the law of breach of contract, and an advance over the ideological
result-orientation of the blacklist era contract decisions. But the
appellate courts' eventual affection for the BSO's artistic integrity
defense' 2" arguably resurrected the morals clause as a matter of
constitutional law. That is, in both situations courts seemed willing
to defer to managerial judgments that artists were unacceptable
because their political views tended "to shock, insult or offend the
community."
This is not to say that purveyors of blacklists or boycotts should
never have a defense to liability: the Supreme Court has created
first amendment breathing space for those who advocate boycotts
as a political weapon. 121 In the Redgrave case, ironically, it was pre-
cisely because the BSO disclaimed any political motivation that the
first amendment rights of those who advocate blacklisting should
not have had to be balanced against the actress's own constitutional
liberties. 122
The BSO nevertheless invoked the first amendment to its ad-
vantage. Without responding to the specific charge of blacklisting,
' the BSO's brief to the First Circuit asserted its own constitutional
right of "artistic choice and expression."'"
Just as a theater is protected in choosing to stage certain
productions, it has the same protection when choosing not
IN See infra notes 123-25, 131-36, 191-229 and accompanying text.
121 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Inc., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982); Redgrave v.
Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 1 7.2d 888, 906 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S.Ct.
869 (1989); cf. Eastern Railroads Presidents Cot& v. Nucrr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961) (construing antitrust law to exclude petitioning for legislation, in light of first
amendment implications).
The American Jewish Congress argued in arnicus briefs to both the First Circuit and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that the first amendment protects even coercive and
intimidating advocacy of economic boycotts for political purposes, "so long as the means are
peaceful." Brief Amicus Curiae of American Jewish Congress, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, Inc., No, SJC-4089, at 3-6 (undated); No. 85-1305, 85-1341 (the BSO's cross-
appeal on the issue of consequential contract damages) at 3-6 (1st Cir. April 22, 1985). Of
course, direct threats or blacklist advocacy were not in controversy on the Redgrave appeal;
her "John Doe" and "Richard Roe" claims had been dismissed before trial. See supra note 57
and accompanying text,
122 But see infra notes 192-207 and accompanying text, discussing the First Circuit's
contrary intimation. In a defamation case often said to have broken the blacklist, the defen-
dants unsuccessfully raised a first amendment defense, Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14 N.V.2d 899,
252 N.Y.S.2d 95, 200 N.E.2d 778 (1964) (reducing $3.5 million verdict to $550,000), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965). For Faulk's account of the case, see .I.1-1. FAULK, supra note 95;
for his attorney's, see L. NIZER, THE JURY RETURNS 225-438 (1966).
125 Brief of Appellee Boston Symphony Orchestra at 16, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, Inc., Nos, 85-1305, 85-1341, at 16 (1st Cir. July 30, 1985).
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to stage a production . . . [T]he District Court and jury
found that when the Symphony cancelled the Oedipus Rex
concerts it did so for artistic, not political, reasons . ..
[T]his critical factual finding ... not only defeats plaintiffs'
state civil rights act claim, but . . . defeats their claim for
consequential damages as well.' 24
This contention had not figured at trial. Judge Keeton gave no
instructions to the jury on the first amendment "right not to speak"
as a defense to MCRA liability.' 25
 But the argument caught the
appellate imagination, and in the end was pivotal tb the BSO's
success. The appellate courts, in general, were more responsive to
the BSO's "right not to speak" than to the cautionary history and
economic devastation of political blacklisting.
V. THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK
The seven justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
shared First Circuit Judge Coffin's disquiet over the implications of
applying the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act to the Boston Sym-
phony Orchestra's cancellation of the Oedipus Rex concerts. 12" But
they could not agree on a rationale, and five of them opposed either
reading a specific intent requirement into the Act, or relieving a
defendant of liability where he or she had acquiesced in discrimi-
natory pressures from others. 127
124 Id. at 18 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 762 (1977) (first amendment right
to refrain from speaking)). Actually, the jury stated in its post-verdict letter that it believed
the BSO fired Redgrave for political, not artistic reasons. See supra note 68 and accompanying
text. Its responses to the special verdict questions merely indicated that it did not find that
the BSO shared the politically retaliatory motivation of the third parties who exerted pressure.
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
125
 The BSO made passing mention of such a defense in its motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment. In denying the motion to dismiss the MCRA count (see supra notes 59-
60 and accompanying text), the judge did not address this point; and in denying the summary
judgment, he simply noted: The extent to which a broad interpretation of the statute could
interfere with the BSO's First Amendment rights to make artistic judgments may depend on
whether the factfinder decides that the cancellation of the concerts was at least in part for
artistic reasons." Memorandum and order at 9 (Aug. 28, 1984), Redgrave v. Boston Sym-
phony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (C.A. No. 82-3193—K).
126
 See supra notes 73-77 ( Judge Coffin's certification order); 61-66 (discussion of trial
court rulings that the MCRA did not apply if the BSO was simply acquiescing in the politically
retaliatory demands of outsiders) and accompanying text.
127
 Two justices, Neil Lynch and Francis O'Connor, would have imposed these heightened
state-of-mind requirements and thus answered the first certified question "no" and the
second, "yes." Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 106, 502 N.E.2d
1375, 1382 (1987) (dissenting opinion).
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The result was a certification nightmare. Instead of unequivocal
and unanimous answers to the questions that were plaguing the
federal court of appeals, the SJC produced three separate, idiosyn-
cratic opinions.
Strictly answering the certified questions, five justices (three in
a plurality opinion, and two concurring) agreed that the MCRA
does prohibit interference with the secured right of another even
if, in the words of certified question 1, "the defendant had no
personal desire to interfere with the rights of that person but ac-
quiesced to pressure from third parties who did wish to interfere
with such rights." 128 As Chief Justice Edward Hennessey wrote for
the plurality of three,
[m]aking an exemption for civil rights deprivations re-
sulting from third-party pressure "would reward and en-
courage" the very conduct which the substantive statutes
prohibit. . . Whether the issue is phrased in terms of the
existence of a specific intent requirement . . . or a third-
party pressure exemption . . . , recognizing such- an ex-
emption would tend to eviscerate the statute and defeat
the legislative policies behind Litt . Thus, to be effective,
the provisions of §§ 11 H and 1 1 I must apply to any threat-
ening, intimidating, or coercive behavior regardless of
whether the defendant specifically intended to interfere
with a right to which the plaintiff is entitled.' 29
Similarly, the plurality ruled that "[a]s an abstract proposition,
fear of business disruption, fear for economic loss, or fear for
physical safety are not justifications under §§ I 1H and 1 1 . . . .
Fear that the prejudice of third-party actors may lead to a breach
of the peace has . , been rejected as a justification for deprivations
of civil rights."'" The SJC thus answered the second question "no."
Before announcing these conclusions, however, the plurality
engaged in an unusually convoluted hypothetical discussion. From
the premise that the BSO had a right to perform or not, the Chief
Justice wrote:
' 2" See supra note 75 and accompanying text. For text of the two questions certified by
the First Circuit to the SJC.
I" 399 Mass. at 100, 502 N.E.2d at 1379 (quoting Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc. v.
Cooke, 388 Mass. 611, 618 n.7, 447 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 n.7 (1983)). Sarni involved the
unlawful firing of .a black truckdriver, allegedly in acquiescence to neighborhood hostility.
i"" Id. at 101, 502 N.E.2d at 1379-80, (citing Sarni, 388 Mass 611, 447 N.E.2d 1228
(1983); Palmore v. Sidon, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917)).
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[I]t can be argued that the BSO's secured rights were
interfered with [by the protesters], and that it was not
within the legislative intent that anyone should be pun-
ished under c. 12 for exercising the constitutional right
not to speak (i.e. perform). It can also be argued that
when a private person decides not to speak and has no
duty to do so, it would be unconstitutional to require that
person to speak or, contractual obligations aside, to punish
him civilly for not speaking.
The foregoing arguments can be focused on both of
the certified questions. It can be offered that a person
exercising constitutional rights who interferes with anoth-
er's .constitutional rights is not (Question 1) "interfering
with the rights of another person by 'threats, intimidation,
or coercion," within the meaning of G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H
and 111. It can be further offered by way of defense to
an action under §§ 11H and 11I (Question 2) that the
defendant was motivated by the "additional concern" of
the artistic integrity of its production; this motivation is
within the defendant's free speech rights; and that this
independent motivation, if established, is a complete de-
fense to the action... .
We have not considered any of the above arguments
or issues in answering the two certified questions. We treat
the questions as addressed to a typical action under the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, which does not concern a
defendant who is exercising a free speech or other con-
stitutional right in interfering with the secured rights-of
another. In short, we answer the two questions as they are
worded.' 3 '
This was an unusual way for a state court to communicate its
dissatisfaction with the wording of certified questions or its views
on other questions, not asked but related to the disposition of the
case. The three-justice plurality clearly did not like the theory that
Judge Keeton had chosen to foreclose MCRA liability. Its devastat-
ing effect in civil rights litigation involving customer preference or
other forms of acquiescence was obvious. But the judges need not
have been coy: state courts following certification procedures some-
times squarely express views beyond those encompassed by the
certified questions, and federal courts usually welcome the added
II' 399 Mass. at 97, 502 N.E.2(1 at 1377.
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advice.' 32 That the three-judge plurality couched its thoughts in
such speculative syntax may have been a function of the federal
(first amendment) basis of the defense to which it seemed hospita-
ble. That is, the judges assumed that the First Circuit could and
would deal with the federal constitutional issue on its own.
Two other SJC justices, however, explicitly addressed the BSO's
free speech defense. Although agreeing with the plurality's inter-
pretation of the MCRA generally in acquiescence situations, Justices
Herbert Wilkins and Ruth Abrams announced that in their view
article 16'" of the state constitution absolved the BSO of liability.
Justice Wilkins wrote:
I have been unable to think of any theory under which,
in the circumstances, statutory liability may properly be
imposed on the BSO in the face of its State constitutional
right to determine what artistic performances it will or
will not perform. Redgrave's constitutional rights are no
greater than those of the BSO, and there was no way in
which the interests of each could be accommodated.'"
Justices Wilkins and Abrams here seemed to be assuming a fact
that was much in dispute at trial: that the BSO cancelled because it
reasonably feared disruption would change the quality of its per-
formances. It was true the the aesthetic dispute between Seiji Ozawa
and Peter Sellars had proceeded on the assumption that some form
of disruption was sufficiently likely that police would have to be
lining the aisles of Symphony Hall. But the jury believed that the
BSO cancelled simply in response to political pressure and fear of
1 " See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Caguas Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 825 F.2d
536, 537 (1st Cir. 1986) (certifying questions and "welcom[ingl the advice of the [Puerto Rico
Supreme C]ourt on any other question of Puerto Rican law material to this case on which it
would like to comment"); Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Co., 544 1".2d 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (state
court's answer to question not certified proved dispositive); Martinez v. Rodriguez, 394 F.2d
156, 159 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968) (state court may restate issues in answering certified questions);
Corr & Robbins, Inie njurisdiclional Cerlifiralion and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 411, 426-
27 (1988) ("the answering court must have the power to reformulate the questions posed
. . . . Indeed, the ability of the answering court to reshape or add to the issues is necessary
to further the goals of certification."), See generally 17 C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PHAcricE & PROCEDURE § 4248, at 531-32 (1978).
1" Article 16 of the Massachusetts Constitution, Declaration of Rights, reads in pertinent
part: "The right of free speech shall not be abridged."
124 399 Mass. at 102, 502 N.E.2d at 1380. The dissenters asserted in dicta that the case
presented "serious constitutional questions stemming from the BSO's constitutional right not
to speak," questions that would disappear if the statute were construed in the manner they
advocated. id. at 106, 502 N.E.2d at 1382.
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lost income.'" And the only actual threat of disruption — from a
former member of the Jewish Defense League — was probably
received after the management had made and publicly announced
its decision.'" On these facts, it was not clear why the BSO's conduct
was an exercise of its right not to speak, rather than simply a
politically-inspired contract cancellation. Oedipus Rex arguably was
not cancelled because the BSO changed its artistic mind but because
the management wanted to fire Redgrave, and Peter Sellars would
not go forward without her.
The case returned to the First Circuit. The issue of a first
amendment "right not to speak" was now squarely presented —
and vigorously argued. Redgrave's counsel asserted that it would
turn both the MCRA and the first amendment upside down to
discern a constitutional right in the Orchestra's decision to cave in
to third party pressure to fire Redgrave. It was the actress's political
expression, after all, that caused the controversy. The BSO had, to
be sure, exercised its free speech rights in deciding to stage Oedipus
Rex and Symphony of Psalms. Its cancellation of that choice was no
more constitutionally protected for purposes of the MCRA than it
was for purposes of the plaintiff's breach of contract claim. And
no one was arguing that the first amendment, or article 16, relieved
the BSO of contract liability."'
The First Circuit panel announced its decision on October 14,
1987, three years after the Redgrave trial. The court agreed that the
SJC, in answering the certified questions of state law, had rejected
the trial court's imposition of heightened state-of-mind require-
ments under the MCRA. But the three federal judges — Frank
Coffin, Hugh Bownes and Bruce Selya — disagreed on the BSO's
first amendment defense.
Judge Bownes, writing the majority decision on this issue for
himself and Judge Selya, rejected the "right not to speak" argument.
"If the state or local government were attempting to dictate to the
BSO how Oedipus Rex should be performed, there might well be a
i5  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (jury's post-verdict letter to Judge Keeton).
"6 See supra note 35 for a discussion of the tinting and substance of this call.
" 7
 By contrast, film studios and others during the McCarthy Era frequently did escape
contract liability on the basis of explicit or implied "morals" clauses, or judicial 'inferences
that purging the workplace of "subversives" was a "reasonable" condition of employment.
See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text; Horowitz, Political Black Listing, supra note
95, at 263-78. Similarly, the BSO argued that language in the contract entitled it to cancel
because of "circumstances beyond its reasonable control." See supra notes 51, 118 and accom-
panying text.
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first amendment violation," he wrote. "But that is not the case before
us."'" Judge Bownes continued:
No precedent has been cited by the BSO for extending
first amendment protection to artistic integrity in this con-
text, and we have been unable to find any. Although we
can understand why the BSO would want its performance
to be free from audience interruption, we hold as a matter
of law that the first amendment is not implicated . . . .
The Supreme Judicial Court has held unequivocally
that acquiescence to outside pressure is one of the harms
that the MCRA was designed to prevent.. .. Allowing the
defense of artistic integrity would withdraw the protection
of the MCRA from artists, such as Redgrave, who openly
espouse unpopular political views. The effect would be to
give free rein to those seeking to intimidate artists engag-
ing in political activity. 139
Judge Coffin dissented ardently from the panel majority's rea-
soning. For him, penalizing the BSO for a decision not to perform
was the equivalent of a government order to perform Oedipus Rex
in a particular way, the way that Sellars had advocated and Ozawa
had rejected:
The BSO does not claim a "right" against the audience
that would require it to be silent; nor does it claim a right
against the state to require that the audience be kept silent.
The BSO's claim is, rather, that the state is "attempting to
dictate how Oedipus Rex should be performed." It is that,
in a dispute between private parties, the state is putting
not only a thumb, but a fist, on the scales.""
This was a powerful argument, but Judge Coffin did not ex-
plain how it was consistent with the BSO's clear liability for breach
of contract and, as the panel also unanimously held, for consequen-
tial contract damages."' Nor did Judge Coffin say whether a court
that imposed MCRA damages liability where an organization can-
celled a performance, or fired a performer, in response to racist or
' 58 Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., Nos. 85-1305, 85-1341 (1st Cir. Oct.
14, 1987) slip op. at 39 (panel decision), withdrawn and superseded by 855 F.2d 888 (ist Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 869 (1989).
"" Id. at 40, 42.
14" Id. at 48 (Coffin, j., dissenting) (emphasis in original),
01 Id. al 12-17. The First Circuit on rehearing adhered to the panel's conclusion on this
point. 855 F.2d at 894-96 (rejecting Judge Keeton's theory that the first amendment barred
consequential contract damages). See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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anti-Semitic pressures, would also be "attempting to dictate" how a
work should be performed.
Arguably, the common law has dealt with this dilemma by
imposing a general rule against specific performance as a remedy
in personal service contract cases. 142 A direct judicial order to per-
form Oedipus Rex or anything else is, obviously, constitutionally dis-
comfitting as well as pragmatically awkward. But a contract, once
breached, triggers a legal obligation to compensate the injured
party. It does not seem such a long jump to require compensation
for the injury to civil rights as well. 143 In any event, this was the
debate that occupied the Boston legal community as the First Circuit
entertained, and then granted, the BSO's petition for rehearing en
bane.
The debate was without much legal precedent to inform it. The
cases relied upon by the BSO, by Judge Coffin's dissent, and by the
Boston Ballet and a number of universities that filed amicus briefs
at the rehearing stage, all had to do with governmental efforts to
force individuals or private corporations to articulate a message
with which they disagreed, or to penalize them for refusing to do
So.t 44
 It was bit of a stretch to apply this precedent to the issue of
142 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 367 (1981); Loeb v. Textron, 600
F.2d 1003, 1023 n.34 (1st Cir. 1979); Mass. GEN. L. ch. 214, § IA (1986). Judge Keeton,
following this rule, had granted the BSO's motion to dismiss Redgrave's claim for specific
performance back in 1983. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 230,
234-35 (D. Mass. 1983).
142 Unquestionably, different remedies for a violation of law may raise different consti-
tutional problems. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiatn), for example,
the justices differed over which remedies were most appropriate, and least constitutionally
problematic, for Snepp's breach of a contract permitting the CIA to review and censor any
writing he might wish to publish. The majority saw no constitutional problem with a con-
structive trust remedy for Snepp's violation of a fiduciary duty. Id. at 514-17. The dissenters
disagreed on the constitutional point and thought punitive tort damages "the preferable
remedy." Id, at 520-22, 523, 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In Redgrave, no such problematic remedies were in dispute; by the time the case reached
trial, the plaintiff sought only money damages. The battle over MCRA liability was thus
largely one of principle, for it was unclear what, if any, damages Redgrave could collect for
interference with her constitutional rights beyond what the jury had already given her for
breach of contract. Of course, the MCRA does entitle a prevailing party to an award of
attorney's lees, no small matter given the duration of the case and the high-powered legal
talent involved. Mass. GEN. L. ch. 12, § 111 (1988).
144 This line of cases starts with the landmark West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school board cannot constitutionally force children who object
on religious grounds to pledge allegiance to the flag), and continues through Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (applying essentially the same analysis to statute punishing
individuals who covered the phrase "Live Free or Die" on their license plates because they
objcted to the political message). See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
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possible disruption or police presence during Oedipus Rex. Such
possibilities were arguably collateral or incidental to the message of
the music as the BSO intended to express it.
Thus, as the Supreme Court had held in Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education,i 45 a union could not use mandatory fees to subsidize
its ideological speech but could, consistently with the first amend-
ment, use the fees for speech incidental to its collective bargaining
role. 146 In Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 197 the Court distinguished impermissible state coercion to
spread a particular message (in the form of inserts in utility bill
envelopes) from constitutional conduct that might incidentally af-
fect speech, such as requirements that businesses publish certain
legal notices. 148 In Wooley v. Maynard,' 49 where the Court struck
down New Hampshire's requirement that its automobile-owning
residents sport the "Live Free or Die" slogan on their license plates,
it. nevertheless acknowledged that citizens may be required to carry
documents bearing state seals or mottos; these intrusions were sim-
ply too minor to amount to forced speech. 15° And in Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 15 ' the Court rejected an argument by mall
owners that California's rule requiring them to permit leafletting
on their premises violated the first amendment. Observers, said the
Court, were not likely to confuse the leafletters' messages with own-
ers', and the owners were not being compelled to affirm their belief
in "any governmentally-prescribed position or view." 152
475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (state may not force corporation to include a message
with which it disagrees in its billing envelopes); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977) (union nay not use mandatory dues for political expression with which some members
may disagree); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (government
cannot force private newspaper to publish opposing views).
'" 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
' 46 Id. at 222,
147 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 15-16 n.12 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985)). In Zauderer, the Court upheld a state bar requirement that attorneys' advertise-
ments disclose client responsibility for costs in the event a suit fails. The Court distinguished
Barnette and its progeny on the ground that "the interests at stake in this case are not of the
same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tomah), and Bantetie. Ohio has not attempted to
'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'" Id. (quoting Bartle:1e, 319 U.S.
at 642).
149 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
'" Id. at 715 n.i
15 ' 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
1 " Id. at 87-88. To the extent there was an issue in Redgrave of the public's interpreting
the actress' appearance as an endorsement by the BSO of her views, presumably a disclaimer
by the Orchestra could have set the record straight.
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At best then, the BSO's first amendment defense was atten-
uated in comparison to the forced speech claims that the Supreme
Court had recognized.' 53
Moreover, the "right not to speak" argument raised numerous
questions that the record in Redgrave did not fully answer. For one
thing, how was a court to determine what facts were necessary to
trigger a forced-speech defense? Would the defendant have to show
an objectively reasonable fear of disruption, or would any specula-
tive, or subjectively good-faith fear, be enough?' 54 How serious or
"core" to the style or message of the cancelled performance would
the threatened disruption have to be before the defense came into
play? Should there be a balancing test, as is common throughout
constitutional law, where free speech rights exist on both sides of
the equation, or where, perhaps, a plaintiff claims race discrimi-
nation and the first amendment defense is a reasonable fear of
performance disruption by racists? Courts have performed such
'" Interestingly, no party or court in Redgrave cited the factually similar case of Muir v.
Alabama Educational Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983). Muir arose after political and financial pressures persuaded a
number of public television stations to cancel scheduled showings of the controversial "Death
of a Princess" program. Plaintiffs, members of the viewing public, sought injunctions re-
quiring that the program be shown. The Fifth Circuit, over seven dissents, held that cancel-
lation did not violate the plaintiffs' first amendment rights, and that although the govern-
ment-managed stations did not have first amendment rights of their own, they did have a
statutory right to exercise editorial judgment commensurate with the rights of private broad-
casters. Id. at 1038-41,1041-48. Because the court found the plaintiffs had no constitutional
claim, it did not reach the issue of conflicting free speech rights perceived in Redgrave. But
its approach suggested that the broadcasters' rights in such a situation might well outweigh
the plaintiffs'. Id.; cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,572-74 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contesting majority's conclusion that municipal theater was a
public forum and that, therefore, municipality could not discriminate on the basis of pro-
ductions' content; that "element of it which is 'theater' ought to be accorded some constitu-
tional recognition along with that element of it which is 'municipal.'").
151 The evidence suggested that the BSO had received no actual threats 'of disruption
when the management determined to "throw Redgravel overboard" or when, alter she
declined to withdraw and Sellars would not continue without her, it decided to cancel the
entire Stravinsky program. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The SJC did not have the full record before it on certification in Redgrave, but it did
have five hefty volumes of Record Appendix. The SJC opinions do not reveal whether
anyone on the state court side culled this material; the First Circuit order contained a brief
and equivocal fact summary simply stating: "BSO agents testified that the performances were
cancelled because it was felt that potential disruptions, which BSO agents perceived as quite
possible given the community reaction, would implicate the physical safety of the audience and
players and would jeopardize the artistic integrity of the production." Certification, supra
note 75, at 2 (emphasis added). Compare Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, § 3,
12 U.L.A, 53 (1967)("[a] certification order shall set fordi: . . (2) a statement of all facts
relevant to the questions certified ... ").
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balancing in numerous cases involving civil rights enforcement
where defendants claim exemption based on free speech, free as-
sociation, or free exercise of religion.' 55 Given these precedents, it
was hardly a foregone conclusion that a private actor accused of
interfering with civil rights would prevail under a constitutional
balancing test.
In February 1988, four months after the First Circuit panel
ruled for Redgrave, The New York Times reported that the Pepsico
Summerfare festival had cancelled a British National Theater pro-
duction of a Soviet play in which Vanessa Redgrave was to appear.
Christopher Hunt, director of Summerfare, had said that budget
considerations, not Redgrave's participation, accounted for his de-
cision, though he acknowledged expressing "concerns" about Red-
grave shortly before cancelling the show. 156
It turned out that Hunt had raised the issue of Redgrave's
appearance with none other than Peter Sellars, who was to stage
his innovative production of The Marriage of Figaro during the same
summer festival "'Obviously, Chris knows how I feel,'" the Times
quoted Sellars. "'He knows I testified in the Boston Symphony trial
and that I think this is a totally unacceptable thing to do.'" Hunt
rejoined that he had cancelled because of "budget constraints, lack
of a suitable site, questions about security, and a threat to block the
production from a source he refused to identify."t 5'
A skeptic might have viewed Mr. Hunt's articulation of appar-
ently legitimate reasons for his cancellation of the Russian play as
a prudent response to the U.S. Court of Appeals' October 1987
decision in Redgrave's favor on her civil rights claim. if cancelling
'" E.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. — , 108 S. Ct. 2225,
2233-34 (1988)(sex discrimination by private clubs — freedom of association defense re-
jected); Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
544-49 (1987) (sex discrimination by private clubs — free speech and association defense
rejected); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 617, 628 (1986)
(state agency investigation of sex discrimination and retaliation complaints — freedom of
religion defense held not sufficient to bar investigation); Zauderer v, Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-53 (1985) (regulation of certain forms of attorney advertising
— free speech defense rejected in sonic particulars and upheld in others); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (sex discrimination by private business organization —
free speech and association defense rejected); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78
(1984) (sex discrimination in partnership decision — free association defense rejected);
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-79 (1976) (race discrimination by private school —
free association and parental rights defenses rejected).
' 56 Gerard, Summerfare Drops Play with Redgrave, The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1988, at
C23, col. 1.
07 Id.
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a performance because an artist's politics are perceived to be un-
palatable is illegal in Massachusetts, perhaps it is best to be circum-
spect about one's motives even in New York. If so, Hunt's prudence
was unnecessary, for the First Circuit reversed itself ten months
later.
VI. "COMITY RUN AMOK"
Contrary to expectations, the First Circuit's en banc decision,
released on August 31, 1988, did not turn on the BSO's first amend-
ment defense. Instead, despite lengthy dicta sympathetically dis-
cussing the "right not to speak," the three-judge majority' 58 af-
firmed the district court's ruling against Redgrave on a theory of
comity and federalism.
After scrupulously reviewing the three separate opinions of the
Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court in response to the two cer-
tified questions of law under the MCRA,'" Judge Coffin, writing
for the majority, drew the obvious conclusion: "[t]here are at least
four votes on the SJC denying liability on state law grounds." ' 6°
Those votes consisted of the two dissenting justices, who would have
answered the certified questions favorably to the BSO, and the two
concurring justices, whose answers to the certified questions favored
Redgrave, but who argued that article 16, the free speech provision
of the Massachusetts Constitution, afforded the Symphony a com-
plete defense.'"' Following principles of comity, the First Circuit
majority then concluded that because it had to defer to the state
high court's views on state law, and because a majority of that court
had ruled, albeit on different rationales, that, "as a matter of Mas-
sachusetts law, the BSO may not in these circumstances be held
liable under the MCRA," 162 it must rule for the BSO as well.
If the First Circuit majority had stopped here, its reasoning
would have had considerable surface plausibility, for indeed the SJC
opinions suggested that four and possibly all seven justices were
'" judge Frank Coffin, who had dissented from the panel decision of October 1987,
wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by Judges Juan Torruella and Stephen Breyer.
Hugh Bownes and Bruce Selya dissented. Chief Judge Levin Campbell did not participate.
l" See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
1t'u Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 909 (1st Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 869 (1989).
PM See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text; Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Or-
chestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 101, 502 N.E.2d 1375, 1380 (1987) (Wilkins arid Abrams, JJ,
concurring); id. at 105, 502 N.E.2d at 1382 (Lynch and O'Connor, JJ, dissenting).
152 Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 903.
September 19891	 THE REDGRAVE DEFENSE	 1331
hostile to Redgrave's MCRA claim. But on reflection, it is not true
that a federal court, following a certification procedure, must or
even should adopt the result in a particular case that a majority of
the state court apparently would have reached, had the case been
litigated in the state system. Certification is not Pullman absten-
tion; ' 63 and as Judge Bownes, now dissenting from the en banc
decision in Redgrave pointed out,
It is true . . . [that] had this exact case arisen in the
Massachusetts state courts and proceeded in its present
form to the SJC the BSO would not have been subjected
to liability, by virtue of the somewhat unusual combined
effect of two minority positions. But that possibility is sim-
ply irrelevant to the issues here, because this case did not
arise in the state courts, it arose in the federal courts. As
a federal court sitting in a diversity case, our task is to
apply the substantive law of Massachusetts on any given
state law question, not to predict what quirky result might
obtain in the state courts because a particular case contains
multiple state law issues . .
In its eagerness to "defer" to the SJC, the majority of
this court has confused the procedure of certifying ques-
tions of state law to a state court with the procedure of
certifying entire cases to state courts. Federal courts do
not certify cases to state courts. They certify questions of
law and then apply the answers to those questions to reach
a result which represents the combined effect of majority,
not minority, positions.'"
Perhaps prodded by these dissenting remarks, Judge Coffin,
writing for the majority, went on to press a second, much more
complicated, and ultimately less persuasive, comity-based ground
for decision. Proceeding from the simple and superficially persua-
L65 This is the venerable if dubious doctrine deriving From Justice Frankfurter's opinion
in Railroad Comin'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and generally obliging
Federal courts to stay or dismiss constitutional cases that involve complex and undecided
questions of state law whose resolution may obviate the need for reaching a federal consti-
tutional issue. In instances of Pullman abstention, a new lawsuit must be filed in state court
and the state court's resolution of any issues not explicitly reserved for later decision on the
federal side are ordinarily binding. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964). Certification, developed in part to case the rigors and avoid the delays
of Pullman abstention, is quite a different animal procedurally. The Federal court does not
dismiss the case, and only stays proceedings until the state court responds. See generally 17
C.A. WRIGirr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE: & PROCEDURE § 4248 (1978). The case remains,
and judgment enters, in the federal court on all claims.
855 F.2d at 914 (Bownes and Selya, JJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sive fact that at least four SJC justices would have ruled, for differ-
ing reasons, against Redgrave on the MCRA count, Judge Coffin
now embarked on an investigation of the SJC justices' views on the
"forced speech" defense. He concluded that here too, a majority
and indeed probably all of the state high court would have em-
braced the defense as a matter of state constitutional law.' 65 On its
face, as well as in operation, this proposition was difficult to estab-
lish, for only two of the seven SJC justices had said anything about
article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the state an-
alog to the first amendment.' 66 The three SJC justices in the plu-
rality engaged in tentative speculations (not properly even dicta)
about the BSO's "right not to speak (i.e., perform)";' 67 and the
dissenters, in passing, mentioned only "serious constitutional ques-
tions stemming from, the BSO's constitutional right not to speak
"168
In forging these disparate comments by the SJC into a firm
conclusion about the state court's view of a possible state constitu-
tional defense, Judge Coffin began by acknowledging that the com-
ments were dicta. But he said,
they are so deliberate, so unanimously expressed, and
involve such a basic proposition, that we feel constrained
to listen carefully .... We think it pointless to turn a deaf
ear to all but the direct responses to formal questions
where, as here, other important issues clearly are impli-
cated. To do so would be to elevate form over substance,
to ignore a helpful opportunity to interpret state law cor-
rectly, and to demean the principles of comity and fed-
eralism.' 69
Judge Bownes, in dissent, vehemently attacked this reasoning.
Its effect, in his view, was that "the majority allows a state court to
bar Redgrave from recovering on essentially first ameridment
grounds without any independent review by a federal court." 1°
This was so, Judge Bownes contended, for two reasons. First, and
855 F.2d at 909. If the state justices had embraced the defense as a matter of federal
(first amendment) law, of course the First Circuit could not have deferred to their view but
would have had to reach its own conclusion. Cf. Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983).
156 Redgrave v. BSO, 399 Mass. at 102, 502 N.E.2d at 1380.
167 Id. at 97, 502 N.E.2d at 1377.
168 Id. at 106, 502 N.E.2d at 1382.
' 69 855 F.2d at 903.
10 Id. at 912.
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more obviously, only two SJC justices, Wilkins and Abrams, had
articulated an article 16 defense. The five other SJC justices' allu-
sions to the right not to speak did not specify article 16 as its
source."' It was plain that the state judges had debated this point,
and only one, Abrams, agreed with Justice Wilkins' view that, what-
ever the first amendment might mean, article 16 gave the BSO a
complete defense.'" Because only two justices embraced the article
16 position, while five rather pointedly declined to, Judge Bownes
argued that it was improper for the federal court to speculate as to
what those other five would say if forced to reach the issue, and
even more untenable for the First Circuit to avoid the first amend-
ment question on this basis.
Second, urged Judge Bownes, because there was no difference
in coverage or interpretation between article 16 and the first amend-
ment,'" the federal court was in any event free, and obliged, to
' 71 The three judge plurality and the O'Connor/Lynch dissent simply refer to a consti-
tutional right not to speak or perform. 399 Mass. at 97, 106, 502 N.E.2d at 1377, 1382.
17 The refusal of five of the SJC justices to join Justice Wilkins on this point may have
flowed front their uncertainty whether article 16 in fact protected free speech in broader
terms than the first. amendment. See infra note 173.
In a case that in some ways represents a mirror image of Redgrave, a state court refused
to answer certified questions ,because the judges believed they could riot do so without
addressing first amendment academic freedom issues embedded within them. Cuesnongle v.
Ramos, 835 F.2d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1987). The case involved a constitutional challenge to
the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs' exercise of jurisdiction over a contract
dispute involving the Universidad Central de Bayamon. A majority of the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court viewed Puerto Rico's constitutional free speech guarantees as 'analogous to
those enshrined in the First Amendment." Because the federal court would ultimately decide
the free speech issues, the majority reasoned that its answers to the certified questions would
be "purely advisory." Id. at 1490-91.
The SJC in Redgrave obviously did not harbor these hesitations, but the pointed refusal
of five of its justices to reach the article 16 issue may likewise have derived from their sense
that article 16 and the first amendment were parallel, so that the First Circuit would in any
event have the last word on this point. As the First Circuit (speaking through judge Coffin)
noted in Cuesnongle, the Supreme Court "has ruled that abstention [and 'by analogy' certifi-
cation] should not be used to determine the content of a state constitutional provision which
parallels the federal constitution." 835 F.2d at 1491 n.6.
l" This was a matter debated at length by Judges Coffin and Bownes. Coffin, for the
majority of three, argued that two SJC decisions concerning nude and semi-nude dancing
indicated a broader protection for free expression under article 16. Redgrave v. BSO, 855
F.2d at 910-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Sees, '374 Mass. 532, 536-38, 373 N.E.2d 1151,
1155-56 (1978) and Cabaret Enterprises, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 393
Mass. 13, 16-17, 168 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1984)). He also relied on Justice Wilkins's seminal
1980 article which discussed "the future prospects for construing article 16 as divergent from
the First Amencrient." 855 F.2d at 910 (citing Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 Sumnat
U.L. REV. 887, 897-906 (1980)). Judge Bownes pointed out that the Wilkins article, as Judge
Coffin acknowledged, only ruminated on "future prospects" for article 16/first amendment
1334	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1283
reach the first amendment issue.'" Under the Supreme Court's
1983 holding in Michigan v. Long,' 75 when it is unclear whether a
state court ruling relies wholly on state constitutional law or on a
mixture of state and federal law, the Supreme Court will not pre-
sume that an "adequate and independent state ground" supports
the decision. The state court must explicitly anchor its holding in
state law if it wishes to avoid Supreme Court (or by analogy, in this
case, federal appellate court) review.' 76
Because Judge Bownes viewed article 16 as functionally equiv-
alent to the first amendment, and because the BSO's asserted right
not to speak was grounded in first amendment precedent, there
was not in this case an adequate and independent ruling on state
law, which under principles of comity would bind the federal
court: 177
[T]he majority has read between the lines of the SJC's
three opinions, ferreted out a constitutional ruling where
none was intended, and then blindly deferred to that
divergence, 855 F.2d at 917; he cited SJC cases stating that "the criteria which have been
established by the United States Supreme Court for judging claims arising under the First
Amendment . . . are equally appropriate to claims brought under the cognate provisions of
the Massachusetts Constitution," id. (quoting Opinions of the Justices to the House of Rep-
resentatives, 387 Mass. 1201, 1202, 440 N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (1982)); and he argued that the
topless dancing cases "du not constitute breaks from the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the first amendment" because both constitutions protect nude dancing as expression, and
Illederal and state law regarding nude dancing varies only in that under the twenty-first
amendment to the United States Constitution, federal courts must allow states 'broad powers
... to regulate the sale of liquor, [including the right to] ban [nude] dancing as part of [their]
liquor license program.'" Id. at 917-18 11.4 (emphasis in original) (quoting Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975)).
174
 855 F.2d at 917-20.
175
 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
176 Id. at 1040-42. See also Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042-44 (1989) (reiterating
strictness of Long and applying the principle to federal habeas corpus cases).
177 Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 917-20: The majority disputed Judge Bownes on this point
(see supra note 173), as well as on the application of Michigan v. Long: "[E]he 'plain statement'
rule in Michigan, quoted at length by the dissent, makes it clear that federal review of such
a decision [relying on adequate and independent state grounds] would be inappropriate....
This prerequisite is not met here. . . . There is . .. no appearance at all here that the
concurrence or either of the other opinions from the SiC was referring to federal law when
speaking about the BSO's constitutional right not to perform, and the concurrence explicitly
makes reference to state constitutional law as the adequate and independent ground for
denying liability." Id. at 911.
Judge Coffin was on shaky ground here, for Long requires the federal court to presume
that the state court has ruled on federal grounds unless the state court explicitly states the
contrary. Judge Bownes' argument faltered also, however, when he insisted that Cabaret and
Sees (see supra note 173) did not embrace a broader view of free speech under article 16 than
under the first amendment.
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ruling in the complete absence of any plain statement of
adequate and independent state grounds. This flouts the
compelling logic and binding precedent of Long.
The ultimate irony in this manipulative reading of
the SJC's opinion lies in its purported justification: faith-
fulness to "principles of comity and federalism." .
[W]here, as here, a state court delivers a definitive answer
to a question of state law which has been put to it, in the
interest of comity that answer is normally conclusive in
federal court . . . . Not only does the majority of this court
ignore the direct answers supplied by the SJC to the ques-
tions we certified, it finds controlling a question of law
that was never even reached by a majority of the SJC
178
In the dissent's pithiest line, Judge Bownes quipped: "Not only has
the majority ignored the dictates of Michigan v. Long, . . . it has
rewritten Massachusetts law. This is comity run amok." 179
Judge Coffin had an answer to this complaint, though it was
buried in his majority opinion. Emphasizing principles of comity,
Judge Coffin quoted two First Circuit cases for the proposition that,
in the absence of controlling state law, "a federal court may consider
'analogous decisions, considered scholarly works, and any other
reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in
the state would decide the issue at hand.",180
The interesting thing about the cases cited by Judge Coffin
here is that neither involved certification; both were straightforward
diversity suits in which, under the Erie doctrine, the federal court
was obliged to divine current state law. 181 In the certification process,
by contrast, the federal court avoids the uncertainties of divination
by directly asking the state court what it thinks. The state court
may, of course, go beyond the questions certified,' 82 and where it
I" 855 F.2d at 919.
I " Id. at 912. Judge Bownes insisted that in the face of the SJC's three opinions and the
highly speculative nature of the en bane majority's hunches and predictions, the proper
course at the very least would have been to admit the inadequacy of the previously certified
questions and send new queries to the state court instead of "compound[ingi our mistake by
entering into a guessing game about what the Sr 'would' have done if we had certified
sufficiently broad questions." Id. at 919 (emphasis iu original).
au Id. at 903, (quoting Michelin Tires (Canada), Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 666
F.2d 673, 682 (1st Cir. 1981), in turn quoting McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622
F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980)).
laL Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Michelin Tire involved Massachu-
setts commercial law; McKenna, Ohio torts. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
' 52 See, e.g., Corr & Robbins, supra note 132, at. 426-47, and cases cited.
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does so, the federal court, under Erie, is bound by the state's an-
swers. By contrast, in Redgrave, a majority of the state high court,
after obvious due consideration, explicitly declined to rule on state
law questions not certified. In this situation, it seems a misapplica-
tion of the Erie doctrine for the federal court itself to dig into the
recesses of state policy and precedent, including "considered schol-
arly works," to root out and pronounce a principle of state consti-
tutional law that a majority of the state court deliberately declined
to pass upon, all in order to avoid adjudicating the parallel issue
under the federal constitution.
The en banc majority articulated still a third comity-based rea-
son for declining to decide the BSO's First amendment defense.
This one was, if anything, more speculative than the pastiche of
SJC views regarding article 16. As an alternative ground for their
dissent, SJC Justices O'Connor and Lynch had opined that even
assuming, as the majority held, that no specific intent was required
under the MCRA — and that acquiescence was not a defense —
cancellation of an artistic performance did not amount to "threats,
intimidation, or coercion," as required by the statute.'" "This sta-
tutory construction," said Judge Coffin for the First Circuit majority,
"was not addressed by any of the other justices, and there is no
indication that any of them would have disputed the conclusion
that liability could not attach in this case." 184 Thus, because the five
other SJC justices did not disagree with the O'Connor/Lynch view
as expressed in the last paragraph of their dissent, the First Circuit
majority leapt to the "confident" conclusion "that the entire SJC
would, if explicitly asked to decide the issue, concur with the finding
of no liability on both state law grounds" (no threats, intimidation,
or coercion, and article 16). 185
This was quite a leap. As Judge Bownes pointed out, whether
the BSO's cancellation amounted to "threats, intimidation, or coer-
cion" was not an issue on appeal and indeed, had not been an issue
in the case ever since the trial court had found this element of the
statute satisfied for purposes of the BSO's motion to dismiss.' 86
Thus, it was not surprising that the SJC's plurality and concurring
justices did not take pains specifically to dispute the dissent's alter-
native theory. Moreover, said Judge Bownes, "the majority's facile
Redgrave, '399 Mass. at 110, 502 N.E.2d at 1385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 Redgrave, $55 F.2d at 908.
1 " 3 Id. at 909 (emphasis in original).
1 "" See Redgrave, 557 F.Supp. at 243.
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interpretation of the statute is absolutely untenable as applied to
the facts of this case." The BSO cancellation "substantially under-
mined Redgrave's ability to obtain other work," and must be char-
acterized as coercive within the meaning of the MCRA. 187
The pains to which the en banc majority went in order to avoid
the first amendment issue in Redgrave may not have amounted, in
Judge Bownes' unforgettable phrase, to "comity run amok," but the
decision was certainly unique in the annals of certification caselaw.
The majority combined, in one ruling, two very different doctrines:
first, that when state courts go beyond the questions certified, the
certifying federal courts must listen,' 88 and second, that in the ab-
sence of certification, federal courts must divine state law from a
variety of sources, including state court dicta and scholarly works.' 89
It is unclear why the majority acted in this unprecedented way and
engaged in such intellectual contortions; one commentator suggests
that the court may have avoided reaching the first amendment issue
in order to insulate what would have been a dubious federal con-
stitutional ruling from Supreme Court review.' 90
Just five months after its en banc decision in Redgrave, the First
Circuit took a considerably less contorted approach to certification.
Having received answers to certified questions of Puerto Rico law,
the federal court did not simply enter judgment for the party
favored by the state court's responses. Instead, it remanded to the
trial court for further factual development on a question of causa-
tion because the state court had not "specifically address[ed] this
particular issue" and "it is not clear to what extent the parties
directed the district court's attention to it."•"
855 F.2d at 916 (Bownes and Selya. IL concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Some five months later, the Supreme Judicial Court vindicated Judge Bownes on this point.
In Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989), the SJC ruled that
a private university's program of mandatory without-cause drug testing of student athletes
did not constitute coercion within the meaning of the MCRA, and distinguished a series of
earlier cases in which coercion had been found. Id, at 719, 532 N.E.2d at 52-53. Redgrave
was on the list: the unanimous Court (per Chief justice Hennessey) said that in Redgrave,
"we stated that the Boston Symphony Orchestra violated the Act because its cancellation of
its contract with Redgrave had the effect, intended or otherwise, desired or not, of coercing
Redgrave not to exercise her First Amendment rights." Id. at 719, 532 N.E.2d at 53.
188 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
' 89 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
I" Gcrwatowski, Of Comity and Common Sense: The Need to Certify Questions of Unsettled State
Constitutional Law (tOrthcoming in 75 MAss.L.REv. _419901).
191 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Caguas Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n., 867 F.2d 707,
708 (1st Cir. 1989).
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In Redgrave, there were likewise significant unresolved issues
of fact upon which the BSO's forced speech defense depended.
Were the management's fears of disruption reasonable? And if so,
did the claimed right not to perform for fear of disruption outweigh
Redgrave's free speech interests under the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act? Neither the SJC nor Judge Keeton in the district court
addressed these questions of fact. At the very least the First Circuit
should have remanded for their resolution in Redgrave as it did in
the case from Puerto Rico.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE REDGRAVE DEFENSE
Convoluted debates about comity, federalism, and certification
determined the outcome in Redgrave, but the procedural circum-
stances were so unique that the actual holding may be of interest
primarily to federal courts scholars compiling footnotes on odd
miscarriages in certification procedure. The more pressing and uni-
versal interest of the First Circuit's en bane decision is the debate
between majority and dissent over application of the first amend-
ment "right not to speak." Here, the en banc majority, speaking in
dicta, seemed to suggest principles of law that would limit the
potential civil rights liability not only of the BSO but of other arts
and media organizations, of universities, and perhaps of private
defendants generally. Some of the footnotes in the majority's first
amendment discussion were startling in their scope; together with
dicta in the various SJC opinions, they have given rise to a new
"Redgrave defense."
Judge Coffin began this section of the First Circuit's en bane
opinion by framing the constitutional issue:
The MCRA is an unusual statute, a civil rights law that
abolishes the state action requirement for constitutional
claims of deprivation of rights. This is not difficult to
understand in the context of racial discrimination, the
prohibition of which was the statute's primary object . . . .
There, it makes sense to treat private individuals similarly
to the state, just as Title VII is designed as a "private"
analogue to the non-discrimination provisions of the Con-
stitution. But where the issue is the plaintiff's "right" to
free speech, the analogy is strained. Such a right tradi-
tionally has content only in relation to state action — the
state must be neutral as to all expression . . . . The right
is to be free of state regulation, so that all private speech
is formally on equal footing as a legal matter. In the tra-
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ditional context, this means that various private actors can,
without state interference, battle it out in the marketplace
of ideas. 192
Initially, one might ask two questions about Judge Coffin's
premise. First, why does he assume that Title VII legitimately dis-
penses with state action with respect to race discrimination,' 93
whereas the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act cannot abandon the state
action limitation in the sphere of free speech rights? Judge Coffin's
answer is "tradition": free speech (apparently unlike racial equality)
"traditionally has content only in relation to state action . . ." 194
This "tradition," in turn, seems to derive from the Holmesian mar-
ketplace of ideas in which."various private actors, can, without state
interference, battle it out."° 5 Judge Bownes commented in dissent
on this point that his colleagues were "so wedded to 'traditional'
thinking that they simply refuse to accept the basis for Massachu-
setts' innovative antidiscrimination law." 19(3
192 Redgrave v. BSO, 855 F.2d at 904 (citations omitted) (referring to Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982)).
195 The state action limitation has been as sacrosanct, if analytically questionable, in the
field of discrimination as in first amendment law. See, e.g., Black, The Supreme Court, 1966
Term — Foreward; "Slate Action," Equal Protection, and Califirnia's Proposition 14, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 69, 100-02 (1967); Heins, The Marketplace and the World of Ideas: A Substitute for State
Action as a Limiting Principle Under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, 18 SuFvor,k U.L.
REV. 347, 352-60 (1984); Nerkin, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of The Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV.
C.L. L. REV. 297 (1977).
State action doctrine is generally thought to have its origin in the much-criticized Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), striking clown as beyond Congress' fourteenth amendment
power a statute prohibiting race discrimination in privately-owned "public accommodations."
See Adickes v. S,14. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 208-10 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting) (Civil Rights Cases were essentially overruled in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
194 855 E.2d at 904.
195 Id. Holmes coined the phrase in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S, 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas
— the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of' the market").
' 96 855 F,2d at 921 (Bownes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Bownes
might have added that state and federal anti-discrimination laws, including Title VII, contain
free speech protections in their "opposition" clauses, which prohibit employers from retal-
iating against employees who oppose discriminatory practices. 42 U.S.C,§ 2000e-3(a) (1982);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, , § 4(4) (1986). Thus, the very statutes to which the majority pointed
to distinguish racial equality from free speech dispense with the state action limitation for
both sets Or rights, at least to the extent that an employee's speech takes the form of opposition
to perceived discrimination in the workplace. See infra note 225 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the judicial balancing test in opposition clause cases.
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A second question about judge Coffin's premise is what relation
it has to the facts in the Redgrave case. Unquestionably, the govern-
ment could not constitutionally force a private artistic (or political)
organization to sponsor a speech or performance inimical to its own
convictions, or penalize it through an award of money damages for
refusing to do so. The "marketplace of ideas" entitles Vanessa Red-
grave to make political speeches at Workers Revolutionary Party
platforms, not at Symphony Hall. But Redgrave was not proposing
to use Symphony Hall as a pulpit to propound her ideas: she had
been hired as narrator of Oedipus Rex, with every intention of fol-
lowing Sellars's and Ozawa's directions in her performance.
At best, the marketplace of ideas analogy might apply here if
Redgrave's suit against blacklist advocates had gone forward,' 97 or if
Peter Sellars had sued Seiji Ozawa and the BSO over the differing
artistic visions of Oedipus Rex that emerged once fears of disruption
began to color the debate. Sellars had no free speech right to stage
Oedipus Rex at Symphony Hall in contravention of the BSO's wishes;
thus, he could not have sued in these circumstances under the
MCRA even though, if Ozawa had later had second thoughts about
the initial conception for which Sellars had contracted, and on that
basis had fired Sellars, the director would presumably be entitled
to contract damages.
Redgrave, on the other hand, arguably had an MCRA as well
as a contract claim because the free expression for which the BSO
was penalizing her had taken place, and would (if not unduly
chilled) presumably continue to take place outside the BSO's baili-
wick. Her speech, in contrast to Sellars's theories about staging
Oedipus Rex, was neither competing with the BSO's in the market-
place of ideas, nor interfering with the Orchestra's expression of
any views it may have held about Palestine.
The First Circuit en Banc majority came close to articulating
this point. In discussing the marketplace of ideas, the court observed
that, as Redgrave's counsel had conceded at oral argument, individ-
uals picketing a performance would have a first amendment defense
to MCRA liability despite the potentially, indeed intentionally, coer-
cive nature of their activities.' 98 "We see no reason," the court said,
197 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Redgrave's original
complaint. The first amendment unquestionably protects, to some extent, advocacy of polit-
ically motivated boycotts. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Claiborne Hardware and other precedents; Redgrave v. BSO, 855 F.2d at 906.
I" 855 F.2d at 906.
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"why less protection should be provided where the artist refuses to
perform." "t'
But there is a reason. The 13SO, in contrast to the protesters,
was not corporately exercising its right to disagree with or protest
against Redgrave, was not sending a message (as the First Circuit easily
discerned with respect to the contract claim)." As the history of
blacklisting in the 1950's and early 1960's shows, 201 the most per-
vasive economic damage is done by employers who do not neces-
sarily disagree with an employee's politics but who, largely for eco-
nomic reasons, acquiesce in the demands of others. This is not to
say that an employer who does fire a worker on account of sincere
opposition to the worker's political activity would necessarily be
absolved of liability. But the employer in such a situation may at
least have stated a factual basis for a constitutional defense, and the
consequent application of a balancing test. The BSO, by contrast,
did not even make this threshold showing for a constitutional de-
fense, precisely because it was not expressing its own viewpoint but
was acquiescing in the politically retaliatory desires of others.
The First Circuit majority, having explained the "common
sense" limits it perceived on Redgrave's free speech rights vis a vis
private defendants, next inquired whether the Supreme Court's
teaching in the "right not to speak" cases, beginning with West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 2" applied to the BSO's
decision to cancel Oedipus Rex. judge Coffin believed emphatically
that it did. Starting from the unquestionable premise that "expres-
sion in the performing arts enjoys substantial constitutional protec-
tion," 2" the majority cited the Supreme Court's line of "forced
speech" decisions,204 and concluded: "We have been unable to find
any case, involving the arts or otherwise, in which a state has been
' 9° Id. (emphasis in original).
2"° See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; 855 F.2d at 895.
21" See supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
2°2 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these cases and their ramifications.
2°' 855 F.2d at 905 (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66
(1981)).
2°4 Id. at 905-06 (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. —,
108 S. Ct. 2667, 2676-80 (1988) (requiring charitable solicitors to disclose percentage of
contributions actually turned over to charity); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities
Coninfn, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (requiring utility to send consumer message
in billing envelopes); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1976) (requiring display of "Live
Free or Die" license plate motto); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornilio, 418 13.5.241
(1974) (forcing newspapers to print replies to editorials); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute)).
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allowed to compel expression. The outcome urged by our dissenting
colleagues would, to our knowledge, be completely unprece-
de nted." 2"
The leap between the first and second of the two sentences
.quoted above perhaps contains the key to the conceptual dispute in:
Redgrave. For no one at the appellate stage, including the dissenters,
seriously urged that the BSO should have been "compelled" to
perform Oedipus Rex. 206 This is different from the question of dam-
ages, however, whether for breach of contract or for interference
with free speech by acquiescence in a campaign of blacklisting. The
BSO did not argue that the first amendment relieved it of contract
liability, and no appellate judge who accepted the Orchestra's free
speech defense satisfactorily explained why the first amendment
permitted contract but - not MCRA damages — even though any
damages award arguably penalized the Orchestra's decision "not to
speak." The point is that while first amendment artistic integrity, as
well as common law rules of contract, probably protect the BSO
from a court order to perform, the constitution does not necessarily
relieve the Orchestra of damages liability for cancelling a perfor-
mance or firing a performer because audience conditions may be
"less than optimal." 2°7
The en banc majority concluded its discussion of the right not
to speak with an equivocation:
We raise these points not to resolve the constitutional
questions, but to point out how difficult those questions
are to resolve, to indicate that expression-related interests
appear on all sides, and to suggest that the dissent's res-
olution, while motivated by values we share, too easily
reduces a very complex clash of rights to a simple equation
that neglects the serious weight of the BSO's interests.'"
Here Judge Coffin introduced but did not pursue the analytical
crux of any case involving a clash of rights: balancing. The dissent,
notwithstanding the majority's accusation that it oversimplified, did
engage in such a balancing act, and concluded that even if the
BSO's decision to cancel was constitutionally protected, the state's
2°5 855 F.2d at 906.
206 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 920 (Bownes and Selya, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). On the different constitutional problems implicated by different remedies, see supra
note 143 and accompanying text.
206 855 F.2d at 906.
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compelling interest in protecting political dissenters from retalia-
60'1, 2°9 as codified in the MCRA, ought to prevail:
Neither the majority of this court nor the BSO seriously
has suggested that Massachusetts does not have a com-
pelling state interest in enacting legislation to protect the
free speech rights of citizens in the Commonwealth. Nor
has anyone argued that the MCRA does not represent the
least restrictive means of achieving that purpose. Rather,
the BSO asserts an absolute right against any infringement
of its artistic expression. Under established Supreme
Court precedent, it is clear that this argument must be
rejected. 21 °
Indeed, Judge Bownes went on, to accept such a defense
"would flout the very values that the first amendment and the
MCRA protect . . . 'Artistic integrity' under this view would be a
license for the heckler's veto in the arena of artistic expression." 2 "
Thus, the First Circuit majority and dissenters reached a stan-
doff on the applicability of the Redgrave defense to the facts of the
Redgrave case. Perhaps more important for the future are two ex-
pansive footnotes in the majority opinion that address other scen-
arios in which first amendment defenses might be asserted.
Footnote 17 discusses the right not to speak in the context of
possible discrimination claims. A powerful argument for Redgrave
was that the BSO's defense must be wrong because, if correct, it
would justify acquiescence in threats of disruption based on a per-
former's nationality, religion, or skin color as well as her political
views. No meaningful distinction could be drawn between the two
scenarios in terms of the forced speech defense. Yet surely a first
2"" Id. at 920-22 (citing Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club, 981 U,S. 537
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); and, later in the dissent, the most recent of the "private club"
discrimination cases, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 987 U.S. 108 S.
Ct. 2225 (1988)). In these cases the Supreme Court rejected first amendment defenses to
liability for race or sex discrimination. Judge Bownes thus challenged the reliability of the
en banc majority's citation of dicta in two of these cases to support its contention that a
discrimination claim could be defeated "to preserve expressive integrity." 855 F.2d at 921
n.7 (responding to id. at 904 n.17).
210 855 F,2c1 at 923 (Bownes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,88 (1949) ("No enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights
of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself")).
2 " Id. at 924. See also infra notes 223-239 and accompanying text (discussing balancing
of private employer prerogatives or first amendment-based defenses against statutory anti-
discrimination or free speech protections for employees).
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amendment right to cancel a performance for fear of disruption
would not trump an artist's right to be free of invidious racial
discrimination. Indeed, the BSO had conceded as much. 212 But the
en banc majority was not so sure. Judge Coffin wrote:
Of course, a defendant's freedom of expression interests
can also be implicated in a traditional race or sex discrim-
ination case under the MCRA. We do not think it at all
obvious, as do our dissenting brethren, that liability should
attach if a performing group replaces a black performer
with a white performer (or vice versa) in order to further
its expressive interests. Unlike the case in Palmore v. Sidoti,
. . . there would in this case be a conflict of protected
interests. This presents serious constitutional and statu-
tory questions that we do not pretend to survey here. We
do note, however, that the Supreme Court recently has
reaffirmed the principle that discrimination might in cer-
tain circumstances be justified in order to preserve ex-
pressive integrity. 2 "
Judge Coffin concluded:
[E]ven if an artistic organization could not discriminate in
favor of a white (or black, or male) performer, presumably
it would have a much more compelling interest in cancel-
ling the performance rather than acceding to the casting
requirements imposed by the state, even if the reason for
cancellation is fear of community reaction. 2 "
212 See id. at 925 (Bownes and Selya, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reply
Brief of Boston Symphony Orchestra, at 4 (SJC No. 4089). The BSO tried to distinguish
race discrimination simply as more despicable than interference with free speech; the Amer-
ican Jewish Congress, as amicus curiae, advanced a convoluted version of the same theme.
Brief of American Jewish Congress to First Circuit at 13-19 (theorizing that racial equality
is "broader" right than free speech).
213 855 F.2d at 904 n.17 (emphasis in original) (citing dicta in New York State Club Ass'n.
Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988) ("conceivable" that
organization could show its expressive purposes would be impeded if it could not discrimi-
nate); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) ("arguable" that admitting
women would change the organization's message "because of the gender-based assumptions
of the audience")). As noted supra note 209 and accompanying text, Judge Bownes objected
to this use of dicta from private club cases in which the Supreme Court had rejected first
amendment defenses. Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 921 n.'7. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984),
relied upon by Judge Bownes and distinguished here by Judge Coffin, rejected an argument
that a state court could essentially acquiesce in racial bigotry by removing a white child from
its mother's custody after she married a black man because community attitudes might make
the child's life harder.
214 855 F.2d at 905 n.I7 (emphasis in original).
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Read literally, perhaps footnote 17 is not surprising. A theater
does have an artistic right to make casting decisions based on a
performer's appearance, presumably including her race. But this is
a far cry from any issue raised by the facts of Redgrave. And when,
in the passage quoted above, the court refers to the actual Redgrave
situation (acquiescence in community pressure), it loads the dice by
characterizing legal liability for employment discrimination as "cast-
ing requirements imposed by the state," This characterization is
hardly fair when, in the hypothetical, the defendant organization
has made or desires to make its own casting decision, but ultimately
changes that decision and acquiesces in the bigotry of others. Yet
footnote 17 seems to imply that imposing liability on a performance
organization for acquiescence to racism would amount to "casting
requirements imposed by the state," and thus violate the first
amendment.
The majority's second loaded footnote addressed applications
of the Redgrave defense beyond the performance context. "[U]nder
the dissent's theory of the MCRA," wrote Judge Coffin,
a private university would be liable for denying tenure to
a professor whose views it found politically reprehensible,
or to a scholar who might cause turmoil on campus. A
newspaper could not, without running afoul of the statute,
cancel an opinion writer's column in response to outrage
in the community, even if it meant that the newspaper's
reputation was impugned or that great numbers of people
stopped reading the paper. While we may commend those
institutions and artists that resist such public pressure, no
court has, to our knowledge, ever held legally accountable
those private groups or artists that do succumb to public
taste. 215
Though few might quarrel with the newspaper hypothetical in
this footnote,216 a university does seem a different matter. Academic
21 ' Id. at 906 n.21.
416 But note that the majority here elides the distinction between a columnist's work for
the newspaper (clearly subject to the boss' editorial control) and her outside political activity
or expression of views (the Redgrave situation). See Schneider v. Indian River Community
College Fdtm, Inc., 684 P. Supp. 283,286-87 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (no first amendment violation
where college radio station fired reporters who disobeyed orders not to broadcast particular
stories). It is not so clear that the media, whether privately or publicly owned, may without
liability fire an employee for political views that arc unrelated to her job performance.
Moreover, a distinction might be made between firings motivated by the publisher's own
disapproval of the reporter's views, and firings motivated by fear of financial loss. See Loyalty
and Private Employment, supra note 95 at 977-78 (describing arbitrators' decision approving
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freedom adheres as much, if not more, to the individual scholar as
to her corporate employer, 217
 and though the state generally has no
business telling a private university what to teach, it is not clear that
a university that fires a teacher for expressing herself on matters of
public concern has a first amendment right to do so that outweighs
whatever statutory rights the teacher could invoke.
For one thing, the university itself, whether public or private,
is a "marketplace of ideas." 218 In our society, its very function is to
nourish diversity; it does not speak with a single voice. 2 ' 9 For an-
other, a university is in little danger that the public will perceive
obnoxious voices on its faculty as speaking for the institution; 22"
thus, it is difficult to see how its toleration of dissidents, even if
coerced by courts, interferes with its "right not to speak." Indeed,
in "retaliation" cases brought under federal or state employment
discrimination or labor laws, 22 ' all covered employers, 'including
newspaper's retaliation against two editors who refused to testify before HUAC; the paper's
management had acquiesced to community pressure).
2 " See Getman & Mintz, Foreword: Academic. Freedom in a Changing Society, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1247, 1247 (1988) (defining the core of academic freedom" as "the right of faculty
members to seek, teach, and write the truth as they see fit"); Metzger, Professions and the
Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1274-75
(1988) (academic freedom includes protection for speech outside the classroom); and cases
cited infra notes 218-19.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) ("the college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas").
219 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (academic freedom is
"of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.. [T]he First
Amendment does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.... The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind
of authoritative selection") (quoting in part United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
365, 372 (S.O.N.Y. 1943)); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (university's freedom to determine who may teach and what may be
taught is for purpose of providing atmosphere "most conducive to speculation, experiment,
and creation"); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (noting "that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and
practice," and describing teachers "as the priests of our democracy"). See also Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J,) (quoting
Sweezy and Keyishian and recognizing that achieving diversity of student body is a compelling
state interest). Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Bakke also cites Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629, 634 (1950) ("ffiew [law] students ... would choose to study in an academic vacuum,
removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned"). The fact that all these academic freedom cases involved teaching, studying, or
politically associating at state institutions underscores the location of the constitutional right
primarily in individuals and not their university employers.
2" Cf. Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980); supra notes
144-53 and accompanying text.
22 ' E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3a (1982) (unlawful to discriminate against employee who
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academic ones, may be liable if they penalize employees who speak
out in opposition to practices they reasonably believe to be unlaw-
fu 1 . 222
In academia, as elsewhere in the private employment sector,
civil rights laws sometimes conflict with management prerogatives,
whether or not constitutionally-based. The examples are legion:
freedom of association defenses to public accommodation or other
civil rights suits; 223
 religious freedom claims to immunity from laws
prohibiting discrimination because of race or sex, including preg-
nancy; 224 challenges to interpretation of the opposition clauses of
antidiscrimination laws that conflict with the perceived needs of
management; 225
 recent "academic freedom" objections to the pro-
"has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter");
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4(4) (1986) ("unlawful to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate
against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter .. .").
222 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 5 (1986). Remedies may
include back pay, damages, and job reinstatement.
223
 E.g., supra note 213 and cases died therein; Ilishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69
(1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Concord Rod & Gun Club v. MCAD, 402
Mass. 716, 721, 524 N.E.2d 1364, 1367 (1988).
224 Ohio Civil Rights Courim'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (refusing
to enjoin, on first amendment grounds, state agency investigation of sex discrimination and
retaliation claims); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983)
(rejecting religious freedom defense to rescission of tax exemption because of race discrim-
ination); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-71
(4th Cir. 1985) (employment discrimination claim barred by first amendment), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1020 (1986); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277-82 (9th
Cir. 1982) (first amendment no bar to discrimination claim involving church-affiliated pub-
lishing house); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284-87
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding, after close factual analysis, that seminary's relations with employees
who function in ministerial capacity are not governed by Title VII, but that first amendment
does not bar EEOC regulation of relations with nonministerial staff), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
905 (1982); EEOC v, Mississippi College, 626 F.2(1 477, 486-89 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting
first amendment defense to investigation of race and sex discrimination charges involving
secular teachers at religious college), cert, denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Madsen v. Irwin, 395
Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985) (first amendment exemption for religiously-motivated
firing of lesbian employee, but not for invasion of privacy and other torts).
223 See supra note 221 and accompanying text; Jones v, Flagship Intl, 793 F.2d 714, 727-
`29 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying balancing lest, court concludes that Title Vii did not protect
the company's equal opportunity manager from retaliation where she solicited others to file
EEOC complaints and sought to lead class action suit), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987);
Mozee v. ,Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (opposition under Title VII may
not be "excessively disloyal or hostile or disruptive and damaging to the employer's business");
Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1142-46, reh. denied, 660
F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1981) (whether opposition is protected depends on form it takes; court
must balance to determine if conduct was "unjustifiably detrimental .to the employer's inter-
ests") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1000 (1982); Rosser v. Laborers' Int'l
Union, Local 438, 616 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1980) (where "employee's conduct in protest
of an unlawful employment practice so interferes with the performance of his job that it
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duction of confidential tenure review files in discrimination suits. 226
These defenses are sometimes rejected; sometimes they prevail. In
any event, courts examine the facts and balance the interests on
each side. 227 In Redgrave, the en banc majority suggested a broad
addition to the arsenal: a right-not-to-speak defense that conceiva-
bly could shield not only universities and private schools, but all
employers who fire controversial staff, whether or not in acquies-
cence to community pressure.
What is ominous about footnote 21 of the First Circuit's ma-
jority opinion in Redgrave is its resemblance to the attitude so prev-
alent in the blacklist era, and documented by Professor Ellen
Schrecker in her recent book No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the
Universities. 228 As Schrecker shows in painstaking detail, universities
in the 1950's almost without exception acquiesced in the dominant
political attitude that present or former Marxists or communists
were not fit to teach unless, perchance, they publicly renounced
their past sins and cooperated with the FBI or investigating com-
mittees by "naming names." The result was a purge so massive, a
destruction of lives and careers so devastating to the spirit of aca-
demic freedom, that it is difficult to believe that the judges of the
First Circuit majority would welcome a return to that climate of
fear. In this historical sense the final sentence of footnote 21, re-
marking that "no court has, to our knowledge, ever held legally
renders him ineffective in the position for which he was employed 	 his conduct, or form
of opposition, is not covered" by Title VII), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); Hochstadt v.
Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 229-34 (1st Cir. 1976) (illegal
or unreasonably hostile or aggressive forms of opposition unprotected); Mitchell v. Visser,
529 F. Supp. 1034, 1043 (D. Kan. 1981) (court "must balance Title VI l's goal of encouraging
reasonably expressed opposition to employer discrimination against management's recog-
nized prerogative to maintain internal discipline and a stable working environment").
226 See discussion and cases cited in Gray, Academic Freedom and Nondiscrimination: Enemies
or Allies? 66 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1606-08 (1988) (describing AAUP view that 'judicially
compelled disclosure infringes on institutional autonomy rather than on individual academic
freedom.").
222 In private employment free speech cases, the balancing need not be very different
from the familiar Pickering and Elrod tests that govern public employees' first amendment
claims. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568-70 (1968) (court must balance
employee's interest in speaking on matters of public concern, public's interest in receiving
views and information, and government employer's interest in efficiency and managerial
control); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-63, 367-68 (1976) (in context of patronage
dismissals, courts look to nature and sensitivity of job in question, thus balancing plaintiff's
interest in free political association against defendant's right to politically simpatico staff in
policymaking and other sensitive posts); Brand v, Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (recog-
nizing that in some instances government may have "overriding interest" in requiring em-
ployees' beliefs to conform to those of hiring authority).
228 E. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (1986).
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accountable those private groups or artists that do succumb to public
taste," seems undiplomatic at best.
Massachusetts litigators have lost little time in seizing upon the
intimations in Redgrave, in both the First Circuit majority decision
and the various opinions of the SJC, and urging that a first amend-
ment-based academic freedom or corporate right not to speak ab-
solves them of liability under the MCRA or other state laws. in Korb
v. Raytheon Corp., 229
 for example, a former vice president of Ray-
theon alleged that he was fired after he participated in a press
conference critical of the Reagan defense budget. The company
moved to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, that Redgrave afforded
it a right to fire an employee, at least a high-level one, with whose
views (expressed as a private citizen) it disagreed. 23° Korb alleged
that angry idealogues in the Defense Department has pressured
Raytheon into sacking him.
Similarly, in Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, the university
appealed from a judgment holding it liable for sex discrimination
in a faculty tenure decision. One argument on appeal was that
Redgrave prohibited the introduction of evidence reflecting BU
President John Silber's publicly-expressed views on working moth-
ers. 231 As BU put it,
[T]he admission into evidence of a speech by an academic
concerning a debatable topic, purportedly to show an
ideological taint, will necessarily discourage university
presidents, faculty members, and other university person-
nel who participate in tenure and promotion decisions
from making any statement which in another context —
229
 707 F. Supp. 63 (I). Mass. 1989) (order remanding case from federal to state court).
239
 Memorandum in support of Defendant Raytheon Company's Motion to Dismiss, 11—
15, Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 707 F. Supp. 63 (D. Mass. 1989) (C.A. No. 87-2992—WD).
Raytheon's argument replicated a defense asserted by Lockheed Corporation in a blacklisting-
era case, that a statute protecting employees from retaliation for their political activities or
associations "deprives an employer of the right of free speech and prevents him from
publishing his political beliefs or views among his employees." Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 486, 171 P.2d 21, 25 (1946). The California court rejected
the argument summarily, though construing the statute to denude it of much practical force.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
In Korb, by contrast, a federal judge (in an order remanding the case to state court after
it had been improperly removed), noted that "a very strong argument can be made" that the
Redgrave defense "will dispose of the case in a manner favorable to the defendant." Korb v.
Raytheon Co., 707 F. Supp. 63, 69, n.5 (D.Mass. 1989). At this writing, the state court has
not acted on the motion to dismiss.
2"
 Brief for Trustees of Boston University at 48, Brown v. Trustees of Boston University,
No. 88-1288 (1st Cir. June 1, 1988).
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•
such as that of this case — may be viewed as insufficiently
"progressive" or unpopular with a particular audience. Cf.
Redgrave, . (suggesting that exercise of constitutional
right of free speech cannot constitute evidence of inter-
ference with the rights of another). 232
Amici supporting BU in this case argued that the broad prin-
ciple of corporate academic freedom embedded in Redgrave pro-
hibited a court from ordering a university to tenure a professor
found to be the victim of sex discrimination. 233 "A judicially imposed
choice of a permanent faculty member," they said, "constitutes a
distinct and serious limitation on the first amendment freedom of
a university to determine who will be appointed to its permanent
gathering of scholars." 234
Perhaps the most imaginative use of Redgrave to date was in
Bally v. Northeastern University, a drug testing case in which a student
athlete challenged Northeastern University's policy of conditioning
athletic participation on without-cause urinalysis testing for
drugs. 235 Bally invoked both the MCRA and Massachusetts' right to
privacy statute. 236 Northeastern argued that its drug testing was an
"educational policy decision," hence protected by academic free-
dom, hence immune from legal challenge under Redgrave.237
Regardless of how new assertions of the Redgrave defense are
resolved, and whatever factual showing the courts eventually re-
quire or balancing tests they impose, the dicta in Redgrave v. BSO
has, by stretching the forced speech doctrine, handed a new weapon
to private corporate defendants in civil rights and employment
discrimination cases. Whether this Redgrave defense becomes a new
Lochnerism, 238 in first amendment rather than freedom of contract
regalia, depends ultimately on the judiciary's sensitivity to individual
232 Id.
23 ' Brief Amicus Curiae of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President and Trustees
of Williams College, Boston College, Tufts University, Suffolk University and Adelphi Col-
lege, id. at 1.
' 34 Id.
235
	 v, Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713,532 N.E.2d 49 (1989). For Bally's




GEN. L. ch. 214, § I B (1988).
231 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 28-31, Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass,
713,532 N.E.2d 49 (1989) (SJC No, 4822); Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant Northeast-
ern University at 6-9 (quoting note 21 of Redgrave en bane opinion). The SJC reversed the
lower court ruling for Bally on statutory grounds and did not comment on Northeastern's
use of the Redgrave defense. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
2" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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rights and liberties in the face of increasingly aggressive assertions
of managerial or institutional immunity.
EPILOGUE
In September 1988, Redgrave's lawyers filed a petition for
rehearing in the First Circuit. They asked the court to certify new
questions of law to the SJC to determine the "elements and burdens
of proof" in any state constitutional defense to MCRA liability,
should a majority of the state judges agree that such a defense
existed. Kornstein and Wexler contended that they never had a real
opportunity to argue this issue to the SJC, that "no State law defense
has been defined by any court," and that "no court has ever under-
taken a review of the facts of this case to determine whether BSO
has proved any conceivable State law defense."'"
The petition for rehearing reiterated a point that seemed to
have been lost in the appellate proceedings: that on the facts of the
case, there was at least a serious question whether the Symphony
was motivated by legitimate fears of performance disruption. "[T]he
decision to terminate Redgrave was made days before BSO decided
to terminate the performance, and in the absence of any threat of
disruption . . ."240 Recertification was necessary because the en
Banc ruling was based on guesswork, and deprived Redgrave "of
her most basic right to fair and reasonable treatment by the judicial
system. "24' In a flight of litigative imagination, Redgrave's lawyers
closed by reminding the court of the Cocteau/Stravinsky text of
Oedipus Rex:
Besieged by acts and riddles difficult to comprehend,
Crean says to Oedipus: "Seeing to what a pass we have
come, 'tis better to learn clearly what should be done"
(Lines 1443-45). This Court should not be content to have
justice here rest upon a riddle but instead should say to
the Supreme Judicial Court, as Oedipus said to Tiresias;
"Speak again that I may learn it better" (Line 3590). 242
The petition for rehearing was denied without comment.
259 Motion of Plaintiffs-Appellants for Rehearing and for Certification of Issues to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court at 2, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Nos.
85-1305, 85-1341 (1st Cir. Sept. 9, 1988) (emphases in original).
240 Id. at
 7 .
241 Id. at 12-13.
944 Id. at 13.
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A petition for a writ of certiorari followed. It was difficult to
fit this procedurally convoluted case, seemingly turning on unique
and highly specialized issues of state law and certification practice,
into one of the Supreme Court's narrow categories of "certworthi-
ness."2" As the plaintiff's attorneys were all too well aware, no court
in the entire tortured course of the Redgrave litigation had actually
ruled on application of a first amendment forced speech defense in
these circumstances, an issue that might have piqued the Supreme
Court justices' interest. The cert. petition was denied on January
23, 1989. 244
Shortly after the First Circuit released its en bane decision, New
York Times drama critic Frank Rich reviewed a London production
of Tennessee Williams' play, Orpheus Descending, with Redgrave star-
ring in a performance that Rich described as "indelible" and "re-
demptive." 245
 A month later Rich returned to the theme:
Will homebound Americans ever see it [Orpheus Descend-
ing]? One can hardly assume so; Miss Redgrave, whose
vocal support for the Palestine Liberation Organization is
repugnant to many, has been conspicuously absent from
our stages since the Boston Symphony Orchestra cancelled
her engagement as a narrator for Stravinsky's Oedipus Rex
in 1982. In the meantime, Americans are missing the
creative prime of the greatest actress in the English-speak-
ing theater. 245
Redgrave was a case with implications for both political and
cultural freedom. It had to do with art as well as employment, with
what Peter Sellars called "cultural monuments" that he, the BSO,
and classical actresses like Vanessa Redgrave "have been entrusted
with."247 In this it resembled cases of the blacklist era, in which the
courts failed so miserably to prevent or even slow a massive wave
of retaliation against artists, teachers, and others who exercised their
first amendment rights. 248 As a result, cultural life in the United
2" See U.S. SUP. CT. R. 17.
"4 109 S. Ct. 869.
245 Rich, In London, Taking Williams Seriously, The New York Times, Dec. 17, 1988. at
C15, col.3.
246 Rich, West End Risks and Rewards, The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1989. at § 2, 1.
Orpheus Descending (with Redgrave starring) in fact opened without incident in New York on
Sept. 24, 1989.
2 ' 17 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
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States was impoverished; hundreds if not thousands of talented
writers, directors, teachers, and performers were silenced . 249
It is not enough to argue, in defense of the courts then or now,
that not all social or political evils can be judicially eradicated, or
that the legal tools do not exist. In Redgrave, as in the blacklist-era
cases, statutory and common law theories were available. Indeed,
the fact that Redgrave lost under the MCRA even though no court
actually adjudicated the BSO's first amendment defense may sug-
gest that the defense, even if accepted as a threshold matter, would
not have held up when actually applied to the facts of the case.
Judge Bownes may have come closest to understanding this
strange outcome when he said the en banc majority was "so wedded
to 'traditional' thinking that they simply refuse to accept the basis
for Massachusetts' innovative antidiscrimination law."2" But what-
ever the source of the judicial unease, it ended by producing du-
bious theories of constitutional law, impenetrable ground rules for
the certification process, and disquieting notes of encouragement
for private corporate interference with individuals' political rights.
2" See generally supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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